

Mr. *Locke's* Reply

To the Right Reverend the

Lord Bishop of *Worcester's*

ANSWER to his LETTER,

Concerning some

P A S S A G E S

RELATING TO

Mr. LOCKE's Essay

O F

Humane Understanding :

I N A L A T E

Discourse of his Lordships,

I N

Vindication of the Trinity.

London: Printed by *H. Clark*, for *A. and J. Churchill*,
at the *Black Swan* in *Pater-Noster-Row*; and
E. Castle, next *Scotland-yard* by *Whitehall*. 1697.

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My Lord,

YOUR Lordship having done my Letter the Honour to think it worth your Reply, I think my Self bound in good Manners publickly to acknowledge the Favour, and to give your Lordship an Account of the effect it has had upon me, and the Grounds upon which I yet differ from you in those Points, wherein I am still under the Mortification of not being able to bring my Sentiments wholly to agree with your Lordships. And this I the more readily do, because it seems to me, that that wherein the great Difference now lies between us, is founded only on your Fears; which, I conclude, upon a sedate Review, your Lordship will either part with,
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or else give me other Reasons, besides your Apprehensions, to convince me of Mistakes in my Book, which your Lordship thinks to be of consequence even in Matters of Religion.

Your Lordship makes my Letter to consist of Two Parts: *My Complaint* of your Lordship, and *my Vindication of my Self*. You begin with my Complaint; one part whereof was, That I was brought into a Controversie, wherein I had never medled, nor knew how I came to be concerned in. To this your Lordship is pleased to promise me *Satisfaction*.

Since your Lordship has condescended so far, as to be at the Pains to give me and others *Satisfaction* in this Matter, I crave leave to second your Design herein; and to premise a Remark or two for the clearer understanding the nature of my Complaint, which is the only way to *Satisfaction* in it.

I. Then it is to be observed, That the Proposition which you dispute against, as opposite to the Doctrin of the Trinity, is this, That
clear

clear and distinct Ideas are necessary to Certainty. This is evident not only from what your Lordship subjoins ^{Vindicat.} to the Account of Reason, given by ^{p. 232.} the Author of *Christianity not Myste-rious*; but also by what your Lordship says here again in your Answer ^{P. 14.} to me, in these Words; *To lay all Foundation of Certainty, as to Mat-ters of Faith, upon clear and distinct Ideas, was the Opinion I opposed.*

2. It is to be observed, That this you call a *new way of Reason*; and ^{Vindicat.} those that build upon it, ^{P. 233.} Gentlemen ^{P. 234.} of *this new way of Reasoning.*

3. It is to be observed, That a great part of my *Complaint*, was, That I was made one of the *Gentle-men of this new way of Reasoning*, without any Reason at all.

To this Complaint of mine, your Lordship has had the Goodness to make this Answer.

Now to give you, and others, Satisf-^{Ans.} faction as to this Matter, I shall first ^{P. 4.} give an Account of the Occasion of it; and then shew what Care I took, to pre-vent Mis-understanding about it.

The first part of the Satisfaction your Lordship is pleased to offer, is contained in these Words.

P. 4. *The Occasion was this. Being to answer the Objections in Point of Reason (which had not been answer'd before) the first I mention'd was; That it was above Reason, and theretore not to be believed. In Answer to this I propos'd two Things to be considerd: 1. What we understand by Reason. 2. What Ground in Reason there is to reject any Doctrin above it, when it is propos'd as a Matter of Faith.*

P. 5.

As to the former I observ'd, That the Unitarians, in their late Pamphlets, talk'd very much about clear and distinct Ideas and Perceptions, and that the Mysteries of Faith were repugnant to them; but never went about to state the Nature and Bounds of Reason, in such a manner as they ought to have done, who make it the Rule and Standard of what they are to believe. But I added, That a late Author in a Book, called, Christianity not Mystrious, had taken upon him to clear this Matter, whom for that cause I was bound to consider: The Design of his Discourse related

related wholly to Matters of Faith, and not to Philosophical Speculations; so that there can be no Dispute about his application of those he calls Principles of Reason and Certainty.

“ When the Mind makes use of intermediate Ideas to discover the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas received into them; this Method of Knowledge, *he saith*, is properly called Reason or Demonstration.

“ The Mind, *as he goes on*, receives Ideas two ways.

“ 1. By Intromission of the Senses. P. 6.

“ 2. By considering its own Operations.

“ And these simple and distinct Ideas are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning.

And so all our Certainty is resolved into two Things, either “ Immediate Perception, which is Self-evidence; *or the use of Intermediate Ideas, which discovers the Certainty of any Thing dubious; which is what he calls Reason.*

Now this, I said, did suppose, That we must have clear and distinct Ideas

of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Minds (by Reason) and that the only way to attain this Certainty, is by comparing these Ideas together; which excludes all Certainty of Faith or Reason, where we cannot have such clear and distinct Ideas.

From hence I proceeded to shew, That we could not have such clear and distinct Ideas as were necessary in the present Debate, either by Sensation or Reflection, and consequently we could not attain to any Certainty about it; for which I instanced in the Nature of Substance and Person, and the Distinction between them.

P. 7.

And by vertue of these Principles, I said, That I did not wonder that the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning, had almost discarded Substance out of the reasonable part of the World.

This is all your Lordship says here to give me, and others, Satisfaction, as to the Matters of my Complaint. For what follows to the 35th Page of your Answer, is nothing but your Lordships arguing against what I have said concerning Substance.

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In these Words therefore, above quoted, I am to find the *Satisfaction* your Lordship has promised, as to the *Occasion* why your Lordship made me one of the *Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning*, and in that joined me with the *Unitarians*, and the *Author of Christianity not Mysterious*. But I crave leave to represent to your Lordship, wherein the Words above-quoted, come short of giving me *Satisfaction*.

In the first place, 'tis plain they were intended for a short Narrative of what was contained in the Tenth Chapter of your *Vindication of the Doctrin of this Trinity*, relating to this Matter. But how could your Lordship think, that the repeating the same Things over again, could give me or any Body else *Satisfaction*, as to my being made one of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*?

Indeed I cannot say it is an exact Repetition of what is to be found in the beginning of that Tenth Chapter; because your Lordship said, in that *Vindic.* Tenth Chapter, That the Author of *P. 232.* *Christianity not Mysterious*, gives an

Account of Reason, which supposes that we must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to a Certainty of in our Minds. But here, in the Passage above set down, out of your Answer to my Letter, I find it is not to his Account of Reason, but to something taken out of that, and something borrowed by him out of my Book, to which your Lordship annexes this Supposition. For your Lordship says, *Now THIS, I said, did suppose that we must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Minds (by Reason).*

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P. 6.

If your Lordship did say so in your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, your Printer did your Lordship two manifest Injuries. The one is, That he omitted these Words [*by Reason*]. And the other, That he annexed your Lordships Words to the Account of Reason, there given by the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious*; and not to those Words your Lordship here says you annexed them to. For *THIS* here refers to other Words, and not barely to that Authors *Account of Reason*; as

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any one may satisfy himself, who will but compare these two Places together.

One Thing more seems to me very remarkable in this Matter, and that is, That *the laying all Foundation of Certainty, as to Matters of Faith, upon clear and distinct Ideas, should be the Opinion which you oppose*, as your Lord-
 ship declares ; and that this should be it for which the *Unitarians*, the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious*, and I, are jointly brought on the Stage, under the Title of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning* : And yet no one Quotation be brought out of the *Unitarians*, to shew it to be their Opinion ; nor any Thing alledg'd out of the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious*, to shew it to be his ; but only some Things quoted out of him, which are said to suppose *all Foundation of Certainty to be laid upon clear and distinct Ideas* ; which that they do suppose it, is not, I think, self-evident, nor yet proved. But this I am sure, as to my Self, I do no where lay *all Foundation of Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas* ; and therefore am still at a loss, why I was made one of

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of the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning.

Another Thing wherein your Lordships Narrative, intended for my Satisfaction, comes short of giving it me, is this, That at most it gives but an *Account of the Occasion* why the Unitarians, and the Author of Christianity not Mysterious, were made, by your Lordship, the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning. But it pretends not to say a Word why I was made one of them; which was the Thing wherein I needed Satisfaction. For your Lordship breaks off your Report of the Matter of Fact, just when you were come to the Matter of my Complaint; which you pass over in Silence, and turn your Discourse to what I have said in my Letter: For your Lordship ends the *Account of the Occasion*, in these Words. *The Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning, had almost discarded Substance out of the reasonable part of the World.* And there your Lordship stops. Whereas, 'tis in the Words that immediately follow, that I am brought in as one of those Gentlemen, of which I would have been glad to have

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P. 7.

Vindicat.
P. 234.

have known the *Occasion*; and 'tis in this that I needed *Satisfaction*. For that which concerns the others I meddle not with; I only desire to know upon what *Occasion*, or why I was brought into this Dispute of the Trinity. But of that, in this *Account of the Occasion*, I do not see that your Lordship says any thing.

I have been forced therefore to look again a little closer into this whole Matter: And, upon a fresh Examination of what your Lordship has said, in your *Vindication of the Doctrin of the Trinity*, and in your *Answer to my Letter*, I come now to see a little clearer, that the Matter, in short, stands thus. The Author of *Christianity not Mystrious*, was one of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*, because he had laid down a Doctrin concerning Reason, which supposed clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty. But that Doctrin of his tied me not at all to him, as may be seen by comparing his Account of Reason; with what I have said of Reason in my *Essay*, which your Lordship accuses of no such Supposition; and so I stood clear from his

his Account of Reason, or any Thing it supposes. But he having given an Account of the Original of our Ideas, and having said something about them conformable to what is in my *Essay*, that has tied him and me so close together, that by this sort of Connection I came to be one of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*, which consists in making *clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty*; tho' I nowhere say, or suppose, clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty.

How your Lordship came to join me with the Author of *Christianity not Mystrious*, I think is now evident. And he being the Link whereby your Lordship joins me to the *Unitarians*, in *Objections against the Trinity in Point of Reason*, answered; give me leave, my Lord, a little to examine the Connection of this Link on that side also, *i. e.* What has made your Lordship join Him and the *Unitarians* in this Point, *viz.* making *clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty*; that great Battery, it seems, which they make use of

of against the *Doctrin of the Trinity*,
in *Point of Reason*.

Now as to this, your Lordship
says, *That the Unitarians having not* Vindic.
explained the Nature and Bounds of P. 231.
Reason, as they ought ; the Author of
Christianity not Mysterious hath en-
deavoured to make amends for this,
and takes upon him to make this Mat-
ter clear. And then your Lordship
sets down his Account of Reason at
large.

I will not examine how it ap-
pears, that the Author of *Christia-*
nity not Mysterious gave this account
of Reason, to supply the defect of
the *Unitarians* herein, or to make
amends for their not having done it.
Your Lordship does not quote any
thing out of him to shew, that it
was to make amends for what the
Unitarians had neglected. I only
look to see how the *Unitarians* and
he come to be united, in this dange-
rous Principle of *the necessity of clear*
and distinct Ideas to Certainty, which
is that which makes him a *Gentle-*
man of this new and dangerous way
of Reasoning ; and consequently me
too

too, because he agrees in some Particulars with my *Essay*.

Vindicat.
p. 232.

Now, my Lord, having looked over his account of Reason, as set down by your Lordship; give me leave to say, That he that shall compare that account of Reason, with your Lordships Animadversion annexed to it, in these Words, *This is offer'd to the World as an account of Reason; but to shew how very loose and unsatisfactory it is, I desire it may be considered, That this Doctrin supposes, that we must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Minds; and that the only way to attain this Certainty, is by comparing these Ideas together: Which excludes all Certainty of Faith or Reason, where we cannot have such clear and distinct Ideas;* will, I fear, hardly defend himself from wondering at the way your Lordship has taken to shew, *how loose and unsatisfactory an Account of Reason his is;* but by imagining that your Lordship had a great Mind to say something against *clear and distinct Ideas*, as necessary to Certainty; or that your Lordship had some Reason for bringing them

them in, that does not appear in that *Account of Reason*; since in it, from one end to the other, there is not the least mention of *clear and distinct Ideas*. Nor does he (that I see) say any thing that *supposes that we must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Minds*.

But whether He and the Unitarians do or do not lay all Foundation of Certainty, as to Matters of Faith, upon *clear and distinct Ideas*, I concern not my self: All my Enquiry, is, How He and I and the Unitarians, come to be joined together, as *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*? Which, in short, as far as I can trace and observe the Connection, is only thus.

The Unitarians are the Men of this *vindic.*
new way of Reasoning, because they *p. 231.*
 speak of *clear and distinct Perceptions*, in their Answer to your Lordships Sermon, as your Lordship says. The Author of *Christianity not Mysterious*, is joined to the Unitarians, as a *Gentleman of this new way of Reason*, because his *Doctrin*, concerning Reason, *supposes we must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty*

tainty of in our Minds: And I am joined to that Author, because he says, " That the using of intermediate Ideas to discover the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas received into our Minds, is Reason; and that the Mind receives Ideas by the Intromission of the Senses, and by considering its own Operations. And these simple and distinct Ideas are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning. This, because it seems to be borrowed out of my Book, is that which unites me to him, and by him, consequently to the *Unitarians*.

And thus I am come to the end of the Thread of your Lordships Discourse, whereby I am brought into the Company of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*, and thereby bound up in the Bundle and Cause of the *Unitarians* arguing against the Doctrine of the Trinity, by *Objections in Point of Reason*.

I have been longer upon this, than I thought I should be: But the Thread that ties me to the *Unitarians* being spun very fine and subtil, is, as it naturally falls out, the longer
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for it, and the harder to be followed, so as to discover the Connection every where. As for Example: The Thread that ties me to the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious*, is so fine and delicate, that without laying my Eyes close to it, and poring a good while, I can hardly perceive how it hangs together; that because he says what your Lordship charges him to say, in the 234th Page of your *Vindication*, &c. And because I say what your Lordship quotes out of my *Essay*, in the same Page, that therefore I am one of *the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*, which your Lordship opposes in the *Unitarians*, as dangerous to the Doctrin of the Trinity. This Connection of me, with the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious*; and by him, with the *Unitarians* (being in a Point wherein I agree with your Lordship, and not with them, if they do lay all the Foundation of Knowledge in clear and distinct Ideas) is, I say, pretty hard for me clearly to perceive now, though your Lordship has given me, in your Letter, that end of the Clue which was to lead me to it, for my

*fact*ion: But was impossible for me, or (as I think) any Body else to discover, whilst it stood as, it does, in your Lordships *Vindication*, &c.

And now, my Lord, 'tis time I ask your Lordships Pardon, for saying in my first Letter, That " I hoped I " might say, you had gone a little out " of your way to do me a Kindness; which your Lordship, by so often repeating of it, seems to be displeased with. For, besides that there is nothing out of the way to a willing Mind, I have now the *Satisfaction*, being joined to the Author of *Christianity not Mystrious*, for his agreeing with me in the Original of our Ideas and the Materials of our Knowledge (though I agree not with him, or any Body else, in *laying all Foundation of Certainty in Matters of Faith, in clear and distinct Ideas*;) and his being joined with the *Unitarians*, by giving *an account of Reason, which supposes clear and distinct Ideas*, as necessary to all Knowledge and Certainty. I have now, I say, the Satisfaction to see how I lay directly in your Lordships way, in opposing these Gentlemen, who *lay all Foundation of Certainty,*

as to *Matters of Faith, upon clear and distinct Ideas, i. e. the Unitarians, the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning, so dangerous to the Doctrin of the Trinity.* For the Author of *Christianity not Mystrious* agreeing with them in some Things, and with me in others; he being joined to them on one side by an account of Reason, that supposes clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty; and to me on the other side, by saying, *The Mind has its Ideas from Sensation and Reflection, and that those are the Materials and Foundations of all our Knowledge, &c.* Who can deny, but so ranged in a Row, your Lordship may place your Self so, that we may seem to you but one Object, and so one Shot be aimed at us all together? Though, if your Lordship should be at the Pains to change your Station a little, and view us on the other side, we should visibly appear to be very far asunder; and I, in particular, be found, in the Matter controverted, to be nearer to your Lordship, than to either of them, or any Body else, who lay all Foundation of Certainty, as to *Matters of Faith, upon clear and distinct Ideas.* For I perfectly assent to what

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your

Vindic.
P. 233.

your Lordship saith, *That there are many Things of which we may be certain, and yet can have no clear and distinct Ideas of them.*

P. 4.

Besides this Account of the Occasion of bringing me into your Lordships Chapter, wherein *Objections against the Trinity in point of Reason, are answered*, which we have considered, your Lordship promises to *shew what Care you took to prevent being mis-understood about it, to give me and others Satisfaction, as to this Matter*; which I find about the end of the first quarter of your Lordships Answer to me. All the Pages between, being taken up in a Dispute against what I have said about *Substance*, and our Idea of it, I think has now no more to do with the Question, whether I ought to have been made one of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*, or with my Complaint about it; though there be many Things in it that I ought to consider apart, to shew the Reason why I am not yet brought to your Lordships Sentiments, by what you have there said. To return therefore to the Business in Hand.

Your

Your Lordship says, *I come therefore* P. 35.
now to shew the Care I took to prevent be-
ing mis-understood; which will best appear
by my own Words, viz. I must do that
right to the Ingenious Author of the Essay
of Humane Understanding (from
whence these Notions are borrowed, to
serve other Purposes than he intended
them) that he makes the Case of Spiritual
and Corporeal to be alike.

These Words, my Lord, which you
 have quoted out of your *Vindication*,
 &c. I, with Acknowledgment, own,
 will keep your Lordship from *being*
mis-understood, if any one should be in
 danger to be so foolishly mistaken, as
 to think your Lordship could not treat
 me with great Civility when you
 pleased; or that you did not here
 make me a great Compliment, in the
 Epithet which you here bestow upon
 me. These Words also of your Lord-
 ship, will certainly *prevent* your Lord-
 ships *being mis-understood*, in allowing
 me to have *made the Case of Spiritual*
and Corporeal Substances to be alike. But
 this was not what I complained of:
 My *Complaint* was, That I was
 brought into a Controversie, wherein
 what I had written had nothing more

to do, than in any other Controversie extant ; and that I was made a Party on one side of a Question, tho' what I said in my Book made me not more on the one side of that Question, than the other. And that your Lordship had so mixed me , in many Places, with those Gentlemen, whose *Objections against the Trinity, in point of Reason*, your Lordship was answering, that the Reader could not but take me to be one of them, that had *Objected against the Trinity, in point of Reason*. As for Example ; where your Lordship first introduces me, your Lordship says, *That the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning, have almost discarded Substance out of the reasonable part of the World. For they not only tell us,* " That we can have no Idea of it by " Sensation and Reflection ; *but that* " Nothing is signified by it, only an " uncertain Supposition of we know " not what. And for these Words, *L. i. Ch. 4. §. 18. of my Essay*, is quoted.

Vindic.
P. 234.

Now, my Lord, what Care is there taken ? What Provision is there made, in the Words above alledged by your Lordship, to prevent your *being misunderstood*

understood, if you meant not that I was one of the Gentlemen of this new of Reasoning? And if you did mean that I was, your Lordship did me a manifest Injury. For I no where make clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty; which is the new way of Reasoning which your Lordship opposes in the Unitarians, as contrary to the Doctrin of the Trinity. Your Lordship says, *You took Care not to be misunderstood.* And the Words wherein you took that care, are these: *I must do* P. 35. *that right to the Ingenious Author of the Essay of Humane Understanding, (from whence these Notions are borrow'd, to serve other Purposes than he intended them) that he makes the Case of Spiritual and Corporeal Substances to be alike.* But which of these Words are they, my Lord, I beseech you, which are to hinder People from taking me to be one of the Gentlemen of that new way of Reasoning, wherewith they over-turn the Doctrin of the Trinity? I confess, my Lord, I cannot see any of them that do: And that I did not see any of them that could hinder Men from that Mistake, I shew'd your Lordship, in my First Letter to your Lordship,

P. 58.

where I take notice of that Passage in
 your Lordships Book. My Words
 are: " I return my Acknowledgment
 " to your Lordship, for the good Opin-
 " ion you are here pleased to express
 " of the Author of the *Essay of Hu-*
 " *mane Understanding* ; and that you
 " do not impute to him the ill use
 " some may have made of his Notions.
 " But he craves leave to say, That he
 " should have been better preserved
 " from the hard and sinister Thoughts
 " which some Men are always ready
 " for ; if, in what you have here
 " publish'd, your Lordship had been
 " pleased to have shewn where you
 " directed your Discourse against him,
 " and where against others , from
 " p. 234. to p. 262. Nothing but my
 " Words and my Book being quoted,
 " the World will be apt to think that
 " I am the Person who argue against
 " the Trinity and deny Mysteries,
 " against whom your Lordship di-
 " rects those Pages. And indeed, my
 " Lord, tho' I have read them over
 " with great Attention, yet, in many
 " Places, I cannot discern whether it
 " be against me, or any Body else,
 " that your Lordship is arguing.
 " That

“ That which often makes the Difficulty, is, That I do not see how what I say, does at all concern the Controversie your Lordship is engaged in, and yet I alone am quoted. To which *Complaint* of mine, your Lordship returns no other Answer, but refers me to the same Passages again for *Satisfaction*; and tells me, That therein *you took Care not to be misunderstood*. Your Lordship might see that those Words did not satisfie me in that Point, when I did my self the Honour to write to your Lordship; and how your Lordship should think the repetition of them in your Answer, should satisfie me better, I confess I cannot tell.

I make the like Complaint in these Words. “ This Paragraph, which P. 62.

“ continues to prove, That we may have Certainty without clear and distinct Ideas, I would flatter my self is not meant against me, because it opposes nothing that I have said, and so shall not say any thing to it; but only set it down to do your Lordship right, that the Reader may judge. Tho’ I do not find how he will easily over-look me, “ and

“ and think I am not at all concerned
 “ in it, since my Words alone are
 “ quoted in several Pages immediate-
 “ ly preceeding and following: And
 “ in the very next Paragraph it is said,
 “ how *THEY* come to know; which
 “ Word *THEY* must signifie some
 “ Body, besides the Author of *Chri-*
 “ *stianity not Mystrious*; and then, I
 “ think, by the whole Tenor of your
 “ Lordships Discourse, no Body will
 “ be left but me, possible to be taken
 “ to be the other; for in the same
 “ Paragraph your Lordship says, the
 “ same *PERSONS* say, That not-
 “ withstanding *THEIR* Ideas, it is
 possible for Matter to think.

“ I know not what other *Person*
 “ says so but I; but if any one does,
 “ I am sure no *Person* but I say so
 “ in my Book, which your Lordship
 “ has quoted for them, viz. *Humane*
 “ *Understanding*, B. 4. Ch. 3. This,
 “ which is a Riddle to me, the more
 “ amazes me, because I find it in a
 “ Treatise of your Lordships, who so
 “ perfectly understand the Rules and
 “ Methods of Writing, whether in
 “ Controversie or any other way:
 “ But this which seems wholly new

“ to

“ to me, I shall better understand,
 “ when your Lordship pleases to ex-
 “ plain it. In the mean time I men-
 “ tion it as an Apology for my self,
 “ if sometimes I mistake your Lord-
 “ ships Aim, and so misapply my
 “ Answer.

To this also your Lordship answers
 nothing, but for *Satisfaction* refers me
 to the *Care you took to prevent being mis-*
understood; which you say, *appears by*
 those Words of yours above recited.
 But what there is in these Words that
 can prevent the Mistake I complain'd
 I was expos'd to; what there is in
 them, that can hinder any one from
 thinking that I am one of the *T H E T*
 and *T H E M* that oppose the Do-
 ctrin of the Trinity; *which Arguments,*
in point of Reason, that I must confess,
 my Lord, I cannot see, though I have
 read them over and over again to find
 it out.

The like might be said in respect of
 all those other Passages, where I make
 the like Complaint, which your Lord-
 ship takes notice I was frequent in;
 nor could I avoid it, being almost every
 Leaf perplexed to know whether I
 was concerned, and how far, in what
 your

your Lordship said, since my Words were quoted, and others argued against. And for *Satisfaction* herein, I am sent to a Compliment of your Lordships. I say not this, my Lord, that I do not highly value the Civility and good Opinion your Lordship has expressed of me therein ; but to let your Lordship see, that I was not so rude as to complain of want of Civility in your Lordship ; but my Complaint was of something else ; and therefore it was something else wherein I wanted *Satisfaction*.

P. 35.

Indeed your Lordship says, in that Passage ; *From the Author of the Essay of Humane Understanding, THESE NOTIONS are borrow'd, to serve other Purposes than he intended them.* But, my Lord, how this helps in the Case to *prevent* my being mistaken to be one of *THOSE* whom your Lordship had to do with in this Chapter, in answering *Objections in Point of Reason, against the Trinity*, I must own, I do not yet perceive ; for these Notions, which your Lordship is there arguing against, are all taken out of my Book, and made use of by no Body that I know, but your Lordship.

my self: And which of us two it is, that hath *borrow'd them to serve other Purposes than I intended them*, I must leave to your Lordship to determine. I, and I think every Body else with me, will be at a loss, who they are, till either their Words, and not mine, are produced to prove, That they do use those Notions of mine, which your Lordship there calls *THESE NOTIONS*, to *Purposes to which I intended them not*.

But to those Words in your Lordships *Vindication of the Doctrin of the Trinity*, you, in your answer to my Letter, for farther *Satisfaction*, add as followeth; *It was too plain, that the bold Writer against the Mysteries of our Faith, took his Notions and Expressions from thence: And what could be said more for your Vindication, than that he turned them into other Purposes than the Author intended them?* P. 35.

With Submission, my Lord, it is as plain as Print can make it, That whatever *Notions and Expressions that Writer took from my Book*; those in question, which your Lordship there calls *These Notions*, my Book is only quoted for; nor does it appear, that
your

Vindicat.
P. 239.

your Lordship knew that that *Writer* had any where made use of them : Or, if your Lordship knew them to be any where in his Writings, the Matter of Astonishment and *Complaint* is still the greater, that your Lordship should know where they were in his Writings where they were used, *to serve other Purposes than I intended them*; and yet your Lordship should quote only my Book, where they were used *to serve only those Purposes I intended them*.

How much this is for my *Vindication*, we shall presently see : But what it can do to *give Satisfaction* to me or others, *as to the Matters of my Complaint*, for which it is brought by your Lordship, that I confess I do not see. For my *Complaint* was not against those Gentlemen, that they had cast any Aspersions upon my Book, against which, I desired your Lordship to vindicate me ; but my *Complaint* was of your Lordship, that you had brought me into a Controversie, and so joyn'd me with those against whom you were disputing in Defence of the *Trinity*, that those who read your Lordships

ships Book, would be apt to mistake me for one of them.

But your Lordship asks, *What could be said more for my Vindication?* My Lord, I shall always take it for a very great Honour, to be Vindicated by your Lordship against others. But in the present Case, I wanted no *Vindication* against others: If my Book or Notions, had need of any *Vindication*, it was only against your Lordship; for it was your Lordship, and not others, who had in your Book, disputed against Passages, quoted out of mine, for several Pages together.

Nevertheless, my Lord, I gratefully acknowledge the Favour you have done me, for being Guarantee for my Intentions, which you can have no Reason to repent of. For as it was not in my Intention, to write any thing against Truth, much less, against any of the Sacred Truths, contained in the Scriptures; so I will be answerable for it, that there is nothing in my Book, which can be made use of to other Purposes, but what may be turned upon them, who so use it, to shew their Mistake and Error. No Body can hinder but that Syllogism,
which

which was intended for the Service of Truth, will sometimes be made use of against it. But it is nevertheless of Truths side, and always turns upon the Adversaries of it.

P. 36.

Your Lordship adds, *And the true Reason why the Plural Number was so often used by me, was, because he [i. e. the Author of Christianity not Mystrious] built upon those, which he imagined had been your Grounds.*

Whether 'twas your Lordship, or he, that imagin'd those to be my Grounds, which were not my Grounds, I will not pretend to say. Be that as it will; 'tis plain from what your Lordship here says, That all the Foundation of your Lordships so positively, and in so many places, making me one of the *Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning*, was, but an Imagination of an Imagination. Your Lordship says, *He built upon those, which he imagined had been my Grounds*; but it is but an Imagination in your Lordship, that he did so *Imagine*; and with all due Respect, give me leave to say, a very ill-grounded Imagination too. For it appears to me no Foundation to think that, because He, or any Body agrees

with

with me in Things that are in my Book, and so appear to be my Opinion; therefore he Imagins he agrees with me in other Things, which are not in my Book, and are not my Opinion. As in the Matter before us; what Reason is there to imagin, that the Author of *Christianity not Myste- rious*, imagin'd, that he built on my Grounds, in *laying all Foundation of Certainty, in clear and distinct Ideas*, (if he does so) which is no where laid down in my Book; because he builds on my Grounds, concerning the Original of our Ideas, or any thing else he finds in my Book, or quotes out of it? For this is all that the Author of *Christianity not Myste- rious*, has done in this Case; or can be brought, to sup- port such an Imagination.

But supposing it true, That *he ima- gin'd he built upon my Grounds*; what Reason, I beseech your Lordship, is that, for using the *Plural Number*, in quoting Words, which I alone spoke, and he no where makes use of? To this your Lordship says, That *he ima-* P. 36.
gin'd, he built upon my Grounds; and your Lordships Business was to shew those Expressions of Mine, which seem'd most

to countenance his Method of Proceeding, could not give any reasonable Satisfaction. Which, as I humbly conceive, amounts to thus much. The Author of Christianity not Mystrious, writes something, which your Lordship disapproves: Your Lordship imagins, he builds upon my Grounds; and then your Lordship picks out some Expressions of mine, which you imagin do most countenance his Method of Proceeding, and quote them, as belonging in common to us both; though it be certain he nowhere used them. And this your Lordship tells me; (to give Me Satisfaction, what Care you took not to be mis-understood) was the true Reason, why you so often used the Plural Number: Which with Submission, my Lord, seems to me to be no Reason at all; unless it can be a Reason to ascribe my Words to another Man, and me together, which he never said; because your Lordship imagins he might, if he would, have said them. And ought not this, my Lord, to satisfy me of the Care you took, not to be mis-understood?

Your Lordship goes on, to shew your care to prevent, your being mis-understood:

derstood: Your Words are, *But you* P. 36.
 [i. e. the Author of the Letter to your
 Lordship] say, you don't " place Cer-
 " tainty only in clear and distinct
 " Ideas, but in the clear and visible
 " Connection of any of our Ideas.
 " And, Certainty of Knowledge, you
 " tell us, is to perceive the Agree-
 " ment, or Disagreement of Ideas,
 " as expressed in any Proposition.
 Whether this be a true Account of the
 Certainty of Knowledge, or not, will
 be presently consider'd. But it is very
 possible he might mistake, or mis-apply
 your Notions; but there is too much Rea-
 son to believe, he thought them the same:
 And we have no Reason to be sorry, that
 he hath given you this occasion for ex-
 plaining your meaning, and for the Vin-
 dication of your self, in the Matters
 you apprehend, I had charged you with.

Your Lordship herein says, It is
 very possible the Author of Christianity
 not Mysterious, might mistake, or mis-
 apply my Notions. I find it indeed
 very possible, that my Notions may
 be mistaken and mis-applied; if by mis-
 apply'd, be meant drawing Inferences
 from thence, which belong not to
 them. But if that possibility be Rea-
 son

son enough to join me in the *Plural* Number, with the Author of *Christianity not Mystrious*, or with the *Unitarians*: It is as much a Reason, to join me in the *Plural* Number with the *Papists*, when your Lordship, has an Occasion to write against them next; or with the *Lutherians*, or *Quakers*, &c. for 'tis possible, that any of these may *mistake*, or in that Sense *mis-apply* my Notions. But if *mistaking*, or *mis-applying* my *Notions*, does actually join me to any Body, I know no Body, that I am so strictly joined to, as your Lordship: For, as I humbly conceive, no Body has so much *mistaken*, and *mis-applied* my *Notions*, as your Lordship. I should not take the Liberty to say this, were not my thinking so, the very Reason and Excuse, for my troubling your Lordship with this Second Letter. For, my Lord, I do not so well love Controversie, especially with so great and so learned a Man, as your Lordship, as to say a Word more; had I not hopes to shew, for my Excuse, That it is my Misfortune, to have my *Notions*, to be *mistaken*, or *mis-applied* by your Lordship.

Your

Your Lordship adds, *But there is* P. 36.
too much Reason to believe, that he
thought them the same, i. e. That the
 Author of *Christianity not Mysterious*,
 thought that I had *laid all Foundation*
of Certainty, in clear and distinct
Ideas, as well as he did; for that is it,
 upon which all this Dispute is raised.
 Whether he himself, *laid all Founda-*
tion of Certainty, in clear and distinct
Ideas, is more than I know. But what
 that *too much Reason is to believe, that*
he thought that I did, I am sure is
 hard for me to guess, till your Lord-
 ship is pleased to Name it. For that
 there is not any such Thing in my
 Book, to give Him, or any Body else,
 Reason to think so, I suppose your
 Lordship is now satisfied: And I
 would not willingly suppose *the Rea-*
son to be, that unless He, or some Bo-
 dy else thought so, my Book could
 not be brought into the Dispute;
 though it be not easie to find any
 other. It follows in your Lordships
 Letter :

And we have no Reason to be sorry, P. 36.
That he hath given you this Occasion
for the explaining your Meaning, and
for the Vindication of your Self, in the

Matter you apprehended, I had charged you with.

My Lord, I know not *any Occasion* he has given Me, of *vindicating my Self*: Your Lordship was pleased to join me, with the *Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning*, who laid all Foundation of Certainty, in clear and distinct Ideas. All the *Vindication* I make, or need to make in the Case, is, That I lay not all *Foundation of Certainty, in clear and distinct Ideas*; and so there was no Reason, to join me with those that do. And for this *Vindication of my Self*, your Lordship alone gives me Occasion: But whether your Lordship, *has Reason* to be sorry, or *not sorry*, your Lordship best knows.

Your Lordship goes on, in what is designed for my *Satisfaction*, as followeth:

P. 37.

And if your Answer doth not come fully up in all Things, to what I could wish; yet I am glad, to find that in general, you own the Mysteries of the Christian Faith, and the Scriptures, to be the Rule and Foundation of it.

Which Words, my Lord, seem to to me rather to shew, That your
Lordship

Lordship is not willing to be satisfied with my Book, than to shew any Care your Lordship took to prevent Peoples being lead by your Lordships Book into a Mistake, That I was one of *the Gentlemen of that new way of Reasoning*, who argued against the Doctrin of the Trinity.

The Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning, whom your Lordship sets your Self to answer in that 10th Chapter Of your *Vindication of the Doctrin of the Trinity*, are those who lay all Foundation of Certainty, in clear and distinct Ideas; and from that Foundation, raise Objections against the Trinity, in Point of Reason. Your Lordship joins me with these *Gentlemen* in that Chapter, and calls me One of Them. Of this I complain; and tell your Lordship, in the Place and Words you have quoted out of my Letter, " That I do not place Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas. I expected upon this, that your Lordship would have asfoiled me, and said, That then I was none of them; nor should have been joined with them. But instead of that, your Lordship tells me, *My Answer doth not come fully up in all Things*,

to what your Lordship could wish. The Question is, Whether I ought to be lifted with these, and ranked on their side, who place *Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas*? What more direct and categorical Answer could your Lordship wish for, to decide this Question, than that which I give? To which nothing can be replied, but that it is not true: But that your Lordship does not object to it; but says, *It does not come fully up in all Things, to what your Lordship could wish.* What other Things there can be wished for in an Answer, which, if it be true, decides the Matter, and which is not doubted to be true, comes not within my guess. But though my Answer be an unexceptionable Answer as to the Point in Question, yet, it seems, my Book is not an unexceptionable Book, because I own, that in it I say, “ That Certainty of Knowledge is to “ perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any Ideas, as expressed in “ any Proposition. Whether it be true, that Certainty of Knowledge lies in such a Perception, is nothing to the Question here; that, perhaps, we may have an occasion to examine in another

another place. The Question here, is, Whether I ought to have been ranked with those, who *lay all Foundation of Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas?* And to that, I think my Answer is a full and decisive Answer; and there is nothing wanting in it, which your Lordship could wish for, to make it fuller.

But 'tis natural the Book should be found Fault with, when the Author, it seems, has had the ill Luck to be under your Lordships ill Opinion. This I could not but be surprized to find in a Paragraph, which your Lordship declares was designed to *give me Satisfaction*. Your Lordship says, Though my *Answer doth not come up in all Things to what you could wish*; yet you are glad to find, that in general I own the *Mysteries of the Christian Faith and the Scripture, to be the Foundation and Rule of it.*

My Lord, I do not remember that ever I declared to your Lordship, or any Body else, that I did not own all the Doctrins of the Christian Faith and the Scripture, to be the sole Rule and Foundation of it. And therefore I know no more Reason your Lordship had

had to say, *That you are glad to find, that in general I own, &c.* than I have Reason to say, *That I am glad to find, that in general your Lordship owns the Mysteries of the Christian Faith, and the Scriptures, to be the Foundation and Rule of it.* Unless it be taken for granted, That those who do not write and appear in Print, in Controversies of Religion, do not own the Christian Faith, and the Scriptures, as the Rule of it.

I know, my Lord, what weight a Commendation from your Lordships Pen is in the World: And I perceive your Lordship knows the value of it, which has made your Lordship temper yours of me with so large an Alloy, for fear possibly least it should work too strongly on my Vanity. For whether I consider where these Words stand, or how they are brought in, or what an Intimation they carry with them; which way soever I turn them, I do not find they were intended to puff me up, though they are in a Paragraph purposely written *to give me Satisfaction*; and grounded on Words of mine, which seem to be approved by your Lordship before any in my Letter; but which yet have nothing

to do in this place (whether your Lordship has been at the Pains to fetch them from my Postscript) unless it be to give vent to so extraordinary a sort of Compliment: For they are, I think, in their Subject, as well as Place, the remotest of any in my Letter, from the Argument your Lordship was then upon; which was to shew what Care you had taken *not to be mis-understood* to my Prejudice. For what, I beseech you my Lord, would you think of him, who from some Words of your Lordships, that seemed to express *much of a Christian Spirit and Temper*, (for so your Lordship is pleased to say of these of mine) should seek occasion to tell your Lordship, and the World, That he was glad to find, that your Lordship was a Christian, and that you believed the Bible? For this, common Humanity, as well as Christian Charity obliges us to believe of every one, who calls himself a Christian, till he manifests the contrary. Whereas the saying, *I am glad to find* such an one *believes the Scripture*, is understood to intimate, That I knew the time when he did not; or, at least, when I suspected he did not.

But

But perhaps your Lordship had some other meaning in it, which I do not see. The Largeness of your Lordships Mind, and the Charity of a Father of our Church, makes me hope that I passed not in your Lordships Opinion for a Heathen, till your Lordship read that Passage, in the Postscript of my late Letter to you.

P. 37.

But to return to the *Satisfaction* your Lordship is giving me. To those Words, quoted out of my Postscript, your Lordship subjoins; *Which Words seem to express so much of a Christian Spirit and Temper, that I cannot believe you intended to give any Advantage to the Enemies of the Christian Faith; but whether there hath not been too just occasion for them to apply THEM in that manner, is a Thing very fit for you to consider.*

Your Lordship here again expresses a favourable Opinion of my Intentions, which I gratefully acknowledge: But you add, *That it is fit for me to consider, whether there hath not been too just occasion for them to apply THEM in that manner.* My Lord, I shall do what your Lordship thinks it fit for me to do, when your Lordship does me the Favour to tell me, who those

En-

Enemies of the Faith are, who have applied those Words of my Postscript, (for to those alone, by any kind of Construction, can I make your Lordships Word **THEM** refer) and the *manner* which they have applied them in, and the *too just occasion* they have had so to apply them. For I confess, my Lord, I am at a loss as to all these; and thereby unable to obey your Lordships Commands, till your Lordship does me the Favour to make me understand all these Particulars better.

But if by any new way of Construction, unintelligible to me, the Word **THEM** here shall be apply'd to any Passages of my *Essay of Humane Understanding*; I must humbly crave leave to observe this one Thing, in the whole course of what your Lordship has designed for my *Satisfaction*, That tho' my Complaint be of your Lordships *manner of applying* what I had publish'd in my *Essay*, so as to interest me in a Controversie wherein I medled not; your Lordship all along tells me of others, that have *misapplied* I know not what Words in my Book, after I know not what *manner*. Now as to this Matter, I beseech your Lordship to believe,
That

That when any one, in such a manner applies my Words contrary to what I intended them, so as to make them opposite to the Doctrin of the Trinity, and me a Party in that Controversie against the Trinity, as your Lordship knows I complain your Lordship has done, I shall complain of them too; and consider, as well as I can, what *Satisfaction* they give me and others in it.

P. 37. Your Lordships next Words, are;
For in an Age, wherein the Mysteries of Faith are so much exposed, by the Promoters of Scepticism and Infidelity; it is a Thing of dangerous Consequence, to start such new Methods of Certainty, as are apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before; as will soon appear from your own Concessions.

These Words, contain a farther Accusation of my Book; which shall be consider'd in its due place. What I am now upon, is the *Satisfaction* your Lordship is giving me, in reference to my Complaint. And as to that, what follows to the 46th Page, is brought only to shew that your Lordship had Reason to say, *That my Notions were carried beyond my Intentions*: For, in these

these Words your Lordship winds up all the following 8 or 9 Pages, viz. *Thus far I have endeavoured, with all possible Brevity and Clearness, to lay down your Sense about this Matter. By which it is sufficiently proved, that I had Reason to say, That your Notions were carried beyond your Intention.* P. 46.

I beg leave to mind your Lordship, that my *Complaint* was not that your Lordship said, *That my Notions were carried beyond my Intentions.* I was not so absurd, as to turn what was Matter of Acknowledgment, into Matter of Complaint. And therefore, in shewing the Care you had taken of me for my *Satisfaction*, your Lordship needed not have been at so much Pains, in so long a Deduction, to prove to me, that you had Reason for saying what was so manifestly in my Favour, whether you had Reason for saying it or no. But my Complaint was, that the *new way of Reason*, accused by your Lordship, as opposite to the Doctrin of the Trinity, being in laying all Foundation of Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas, your Lordship ranked me amongst the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*, though

though I laid not all Foundation of Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas. And this being my Complaint, 'tis for this that there needs a Reason. Your Lordship subjoins,

P. 46.

But you still seem concerned that I quote your Words ; although I declare, they were used to other Purposes than you intended them. I do confess to you, That the Reason of it, was, that I found your Notions as to Certainty, by Ideas, was the main Foundation which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went upon ; and that he had nothing which looked like Reason, if that Principle were removed ; which made me so much endeavour to shew that it would not hold. And so, I suppose, the Reason of my mentioning your Words so often, is no longer a Riddle to you.

P. 47.

My Lord, he that will give himself the trouble to look into the 61st Page of my former Letter, where I speak of your Lordships way of proceeding as a Riddle to me ; or in the 59th Page, which your Lordship here quoted, for *seeming concerned* at it ; will find my Complaint, in both places, as well as several others, was, That I was so every where join'd with others under

der

der the comprehensive Words of *They* and *Them*, &c. though my Book alone was every where quoted, " That " the World would be apt to think " I was the Person, who argued " against the Trinity and denied My- " steries; against whom your Lordship directed these very Pages. For so I express my self in that very 59th Page, which your Lordship here quotes. And as to this, your Lordships way of Writing (which is the Subject of my *Complaint*) is (for any thing your Lordship has in your Answer said to give me *Satisfaction*) as much still a Riddle to me as ever.

For that which your Lordship here says, and is the only Thing I can find your Lordship has said to clear it, seems to me, to do nothing towards it. Your Lordship says, *The Reason of* P. 47. *it was, that you found my Notions, as to Certainty by Ideas, was the main Foundation which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went upon, &c.*

With Submission, I thought your Lordship had found, That the *Foundation*, which the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious* went upon, and for which he was made one of the *Gentle-*

Vindicat.
P. 232.
And
Answ.
P. 14.

men of the new way of Reasoning, opposite to the Doctrin of the Trinity, was, That he made, or supposed, *clear and distinct Ideas, necessary to Certainty*; but that is not *my Notion as to Certainty by Ideas*. My Notion of Certainty by Ideas, is, That Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, such as we have, whether they be in all their Parts, perfectly clear and distinct or no: Nor have I any *Notions* of Certainty more than this one. And if your Lordship had for this, called me a *Gentleman of a new way of Reasoning*, or made me one of the Opposers of the Doctrin of the Trinity, I should perhaps have wondered; but should not at all have complained of your Lordship, for directly questioning this or any of my Opinions: I should only have examined what your Lordship had said to support, or have desired you to make out that Charge against me; which is what I shall do by and by, when I come to examine what your Lordship now charges this Opinion with: But I shall not add any *Complaints* to my Defence.

That

That which I complained of, was, That I was made one of the *Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning*, without being guilty of what made them so; and so was brought into a Chapter, wherein I thought my self not concerned; which was managed so, that my Book was all along quoted, and others argued against; others were entituled to what I said, and I to what others said, without know-why or how. Nor am I yet, I must own, much enlightened in the Reason of it: That was the Cause why I then thought it a new way of Writing; and that must be my Apology for thinking so still, till I light upon, or am directed to some Author, who has ever writ thus before.

And thus I come to the end of what your Lordship has said, to that part of my Letter which your Lordship calls my *Complaint*; wherein, I think, I have omitted nothing, which your Lordship has alledged for the *Satisfaction* of others or my self, under those two Heads, of the *Occasion* of your Lordships way of Writing as you did, and the *Care you took not to be mis-understood*. And if, my Lord,

as to me, it has not possibly had all the Success your Lordship proposed; I beg your Lordship to attribute it to my Dulness, or any Thing rather than an Unwillingness to be satisfied.

My Lord, I so little love Controversie, that I never began a Dispute with any Body: Nor shall ever continue it, where others begin with me, any longer than the appearance of Truth, which first made me write, obliges me not to quit it. But least of all, would I have any Controversie with your Lordship, if I had any Design in writing, but the Defence of Truth. I do not know my own Weakness, or your Lordships Strength so little, as to enter the Lists with your Lordship only for a trial of Skill, or the vain and ridiculous hopes of Victory. Nothing, I know, but Truth on my side, can support me against so great a Man, whose very Name in Writing and Authority, in the learned World, is of Weight enough to crush and sink whatever Opinion has not that solid Basis to bear it up.

There are Men that enter into Disputes to get a Name in Controversie, or for some little By-ends of a Party:
Your

Your Lordship has been so long in the first Rank of the Men of Letters, and, by common consent, settled at the top of this learned Age, that it must pass for the utmost Folly, not to think, That if your Lordship condescended so far, as to meddle with any of the Opinions of so inconsiderable a Man as I am, it was with a Design to convince me of my Errors, and not to gain Reputation on one so infinitely below your Match. 'Tis upon this Ground, that I still continue to offer my Doubts to your Lordship, in those Parts wherein I am not yet so happy as to be convinced; and 'tis with this Satisfaction, I return this Answer to your Lordship, That if I am in a Mistake, your Lordship will certainly detect it, and lead me into the Truth; which I shall imbrace, with the acknowledgment of the Benefit I have received from your Lordships Instructions. And, that your Lordship, in the mean time, will have the Goodness to allow me, as becomes a Scholar, willing to profit by the Favour you do me, to shew your Lordship where I stick, and in what Points your Lordships Arguments have failed to work upon

me. For, as on the one side it would not become one that would learn of your Lordship, to acknowledge himself convinced, before he is convinced; and I know your Lordship would blame me for it, if I should do so: So on the other side, to continue to dissent from your Lordship, where you have done me the Honour to take Pains with me, without giving you my Reasons for it, would, I think, be an ungrateful and unmanerly Sullenness.

Your Lordship has had the Goodness to write several Leaves, *to give me Satisfaction as to the Matter of my Complaints.* I return your Lordship my most humble Thanks, for this great Condescension; which I take as a Pledge, that you will bear with the representation of my Doubts, in other Points, wherein I am so unluckly, as not to be yet thoroughly enlightened by your Lordship. And so I go on, to the remaining parts of your Letter, which, I think, may be comprehended under these Two, *viz.* Those things in my *Essay*, which your Lordship now charges, as concerned in the Controversie of the Trinity; and others, as faulty in themselves, whether we con-

sider

sider them with respect to any Doctrins of Religion, or no.

In the close of your Lordships Letter, after some other Expressions of Civility to me, for which I return your Lordship my Thanks, I find these Words: *I do assure you, that it is out of no Disrespect, or the least Ill-will to you, that I have again considered this Matter; but because I am further convinced, that as you have stated your Notion of Ideas, it may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of Christian Faith, which I endeavoured to defend.* P. 133.

This now is a direct Charge against my Book; and I must own it a great Satisfaction to me, that I shall now be no longer at a loss, who it is your Lordship means; that I shall stand by my self, and by my self, answer for my own Faults, and not be so placed in such an Association with others, that will hinder me from knowing what is my particular Guilt and Share in the Accusation. Had your Lordship done me the Favour to have treated me so before, you had heard nothing of all those *Complaints*, which have been so troublesome to your Lordship.

To take now a right View of this Matter, it is fit to consider, the beginning and progress of it : Your Lordship had a Controversie with the *Unitarians* ; they, in their Answer to your Lordships Sermons, and elsewhere, *talk of Ideas* ; the Author of *Christianity not Mysteious*, whether an *Unitarian* or no, your Lordship says not, neither do I enquire, gives *an account of Reason*, which, as your Lordship says, *supposes Certainty* to consist only in *clear and distinct Ideas* ; and because he expresses himself in some other Things, conformable to what I had said in my Book, my Book is brought into the Controversie, though there be no such Opinion in it, as your Lordship opposed. For what that was, is plain both from what has been observed out of the beginning of the Tenth Chapter of your *Vindication of the Trinity*, and the Fourteenth Page of your Letter, *viz.* this Proposition, *That Certainty, as to Matters of Faith, is founded upon clear and distinct Ideas* : But my Book not having that Proposition in it, which your Lordship then opposed, as *overthrowing Mysteries of Faith*

Faith, at that time, fell, by I know not what Chance and Misfortune, into the *Unitarian* Controversie.

Upon Examination, my Book being not found Guilty of that Proposition, which your Lordship, in your *Vindication of the Doctrin of the Trinity, opposed*, because it *overthrows the Mysteries of Faith*; I thought it acquitted, and clear from that Controversie. No, it must not scape so: Your Lordship having *again considered this Matter*, has found new Matter of Accusation, and a new Charge is brought against my Book; and what now is it? Even this, *That as I have stated my Notion of Ideas, it may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of the Christian Faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend.*

The Accusation then, as it now stands, is, *That my Notion of Ideas, may be of dangerous Consequence, &c.*

Such an Accusation as this, brought in any Court in *England*, would no doubt be thought to shew a great inclination to have the Accused be suspected, rather than any Evidence of being Guilty of any Thing; and so would immediately be dismissed, without

out hearing any Plea to it. But in Controversies in Print, wherein an Appeal is made to the Judgment of Mankind, the strict Rules of proceeding in Justice, are not always thought necessary to be observed; and the Sentence of those who are appealed to, being never formally pronounced, a Cause can never be dismissed, as long as the Prosecutor is pleased to continue or renew his Charge.

As to the Matter in Hand, though what your Lordship says here against my Book, be nothing but your Apprehension of what *may be*; yet no Body will think it strange, or unsuitable to your Lordships Character and Station, to be watchful over any *Article of the Christian Faith*; especially one *that you have endeavoured to defend*; and to warn the World of any thing your Lordship may suspect to be of *dangerous Consequence* to it, as far as you can spy it. And to this give me leave, my Lord, to attribute the Trouble your Lordship has been at, to write again in this Matter.

Another Thing I must take notice of, in this your Lordships new Charge against my Book, That it is against

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my Notion of Ideas, as I have stated it. This, containing all that I have said in my *Essay* concerning *Ideas*, which, as your Lordship takes notice, is not a little; your Lordship, I know, would not be thought to leave so general an Accusation upon my Book, as you could receive no Answer to; and therefore, though your Lordship has not been pleased plainly to specify here, the Particulars in *my Notion of Ideas*, which your Lordship apprehends to be of dangerous Consequence, to that Article which your Lordship has defended; I shall endeavour to find them, in other parts of your Letter.

Your Lordships Words, in the immediately preceeding Page, run thus: *I can easily bear the putting of Philosophical Notions into a modern and fashionable Dress.* P. 132.

Let Men express their Minds by Ideas, if they please; and take pleasure in sorting, and comparing, and connecting of them, I am not forward to condemn them; for every Age must have its new Modes; and it is very well, if Truth and Reason be received in any Garb. I was therefore far enough from condemning your way of Ideas, till

I found it made the only Ground of Certainty, and made use of to overthrow the Myſteries of our Faith, as I told you in the beginning.

These Words, leading to your Lordſhips Accuſation, I thought the likeliest to ſhew me what it was in my Book, that your Lordſhip now declared againſt, as what *might be of dangerous Conſequence to that Article you have defended*; and that ſeemed to me, to lie in theſe two Particulars, *viz.* The making ſo much uſe of the Word *Ideas*; and my placing, as I do, Certainty in *Ideas*, *i. e.* in the Things ſignified by them. And theſe Two ſeem here, to be the Particulars which your Lordſhip comprehends under *my way by Ideas*. But that I might not be lead into Miſtake by this Paſſage, which ſeemed a little more ~~abſurd~~ and doubtful to me, than I could have wiſhed; I conſulted thoſe other Places, wherein your Lordſhip ſeem'd to expreſs, what it was that your Lordſhip now accuſed in my Book, in reference to the *Unitarian Controverſie*; and which your Lordſhip apprehends, *may be of dangerous Conſequence to that Article.*

Yours

Your Lordship, in the close of the Words above quoted, out of the 132d Page of your Answer, tells me. You were far enough from condemning *my way of Ideas*, till your Lordship found it made the only Ground of Certainty, and made use of to overthrow the Mysteries of our Faith, as you told me in the beginning.

My Lord, the way of Ideas, which your Lordship opposed at first, was the way of Certainty only by clear and distinct Ideas; as appears by your Words above-quoted, out of your 14th Page: But that, your Lordship now knows, was not *my way of Certainty by Ideas*; and therefore that, and all the use can be made of it, to overthrow the Mysteries of our Faith, be that as it will, cannot any more be charged on my Book, but is quite out of Doors: And therefore what you said in the beginning, gave me no Light into what was your Lordships present Accusation.

But Page the 23d, I found these Words:

When new Terms are made use of by F. 23. ill Men, to promote Scepticism and Infidelity, and to overthrow the Mysteries of

of our Faith; we have then Reason to enquire into them, and to examine the Foundation and Tendency of them. And this was the true and only Reason of my looking into this way of Certainty, by Ideas, because I found it applied to such Purposes.

Here, my Lord, your Lordship seems to lay your Accufation wholly againſt new Terms and their Tendency.

And, in another Place, your Lordship has theſe Words:

P. 93.

The World hath been ſtrangely amused with Ideas of late; and we have been told, that ſtrange Things might be done by the help of Ideas; and yet theſe Ideas, at laſt, come to be only common Notions of Things, which we muſt make uſe of in our Reaſoning. You [i.e. the Author of the Eſſay concerning Humane Underſtanding] ſay in that Chapter, about the Exiſtence of God, You thought it moſt proper to expreſs your ſelf, in the moſt uſual and familiar way, by common Words and Expreſſions. I would you had done ſo quite through your Book; for then you had never given that occaſion, to the Enemies of our Faith, to take up your new way of Ideas, as an effectual
 Battery

Battery (as they imagin'd) against the Mysteries of the Christian Faith. But you might have enjoyed the Satisfaction of your Ideas long enough, before I had taken notice of them, unless I had found them employed about doing Mischief.

By which Places 'tis plain, That that which your Lordship apprehends in my Book, may be of dangerous Consequence to the Article which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend, is my introducing new Terms; and that which your Lordship instances in, is that of Ideas. And the Reason your Lordship gives, in every of these places, why your Lordship has such an apprehension of Ideas, as that they may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend, is, because they have been applied to such Purposes. And I might (your Lordship says) have enjoyed the Satisfaction of my Ideas long enough, before you had taken notice of them, unless your Lordship had found them employed in doing Mischief. Which, at last, as I humbly conceive, amounts to thus much, and no more, viz. That your Lordship fears Ideas, i.e. the Term Ideas, may, sometime or other, prove of very dan-

dangerous Consequence, to what your Lordship has endeavoured to defend, because they have been made use of in arguing against it. For, I am sure your Lordship does not mean, That you apprehended the Things, signified by *Ideas*, may be of *dangerous Consequence to the Article of Faith* your Lordship endeavours to defend, because they have been made use of against it : For (besides that your Lordship mentions *Terms*) that would be to expect that those who oppose that Article, should oppose it without any Thoughts ; for the Thing signified by *Ideas*, is nothing but the immediate Objects of our Minds in Thinking : So that unless any one can oppose the *Article* your Lordship defends, without thinking on something, he must use the Things signified by *Ideas* : For he that thinks, must have some immediate Object of his Mind in Thinking, *i.e.* must have *Ideas*.

But whether it be the Name or the Thing ; *Ideas* in Sound, or *Ideas* in Signification, that your Lordship apprehends may be of *dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith*, which your Lord-

Lordship endeavours to defend; it seems to me, I will not say a new way of Reasoning (for that belongs to me) but were it not your Lordships, I should think it a very extraordinary way of Reasoning, to write against a Book, wherein your Lordship acknowledges they are not used to bad Purposes, nor employ'd to do Mischief; only because that you find that *Ideas*, are by those who oppose your Lordship, *employ'd to do Mischief*; and so apprehend, *they may be of dangerous Consequence to the Article* your Lordship has engaged in the Defence of. For whether *Ideas* as *Terms*, or *Ideas* as the immediate Objects of the Mind signified by those *Terms*, *may be*, in your Lordships Apprehension, *of dangerous Consequence to that Article*; I do not see how your Lordships writing against the *Notion of Ideas*, as stated in my Book, will at all hinder your Opposers from *employing them in doing Mischief* as before.

However, be that as it will, so it is, That your Lordship apprehends these *new Terms*, these *Ideas*, *with which the World hath, of late, been so strangely amuzed*, (though at last they come to be *only common Notions of Things*, as your

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Lord-

P. 93. Lordship owns) *may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article.*

My Lord, if any, in their *Answer* to your Lordships *Sermons*, and in their other *Pamphlets*, wherein your Lordship complains they have talk'd so much of *Ideas*, have been troublesome to your Lordship with that *Term*, it is not strange that your Lordship should be tired with that Sound: But how natural soever it be to our weak Constitutions, to be offended with any Sound, wherewith an importunate Din hath been made about our Ears; yet, my Lord, I know your Lordship has a better Opinion of the Articles of our Faith, than to think any of them can be over-turned, or so much as shaken with a Breath, formed into any Sound or *Term* whatsoever.

Names are but the Arbitrary Marks of Conceptions; and so they be sufficiently appropriated to them in their use, I know no other difference any of them have in particular, but as they are of easy or difficult Pronunciation, and of a more or less pleasant Sound; and what particular Antipathies there may be in Men, to some of them upon
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that Account, is not easy to be foreseen. This I am sure, no *Term* whatsoever in it Self bears, one more than another, any opposition to Truth of any kind ; they are only Propositions that do, or can, oppose the Truth of any Article or Doctrin : And thus no *Term* is priviledg'd from being set in opposition to Truth.

There is no Word to be found, which may not be brought into a Proposition, wherein the most sacred and most evident Truths may be opposed ; but that is not a Fault in the *Term*, but him that uses it. And therefore I cannot easily persuade my self (whatever your Lordship hath said in the Heat of your Concern) that you have bestowed so much Pains upon my Book, because the Word *Idea* is so much used there. For though upon my saying, in my Chapter about the Existence of God, That " I scarce " used the Word *Idea* in that whole " Chapter ; your Lordship wishes, That *I had done so quite through my* P. 93^e *Book.* Yet, I must rather look upon that as a Compliment to me, wherein your Lordship wished, That my Book had been all through suited to vulgar

P. 23.

Readers, not used to that and the like *Terms*, than that your Lordship has such an apprehension of the Word *Idea*; or that there is any such Harm in the use of it, instead of the Word *Notion* (with which your Lordship seems to take it to agree in Signification) that your Lordship would think it worth your while to spend any part of your valuable Time and Thoughts about my Book, for having the Word *Idea* so often in it: For this would be to make your Lordship to write only against an Impropriety of Speech. I own to your Lordship, it is a great Condescension in your Lordship to have done it, if that Word have such a share in what your Lordship has writ against my Book, as some Expressions would persuade one; and I would, for the Satisfaction of your Lordship, change the *Term* of *Idea* for a better, if your Lordship, or any one, could help me to it. For that *Notion* will not so well stand for every immediate Object of the Mind in Thinking, as *Idea* does, I have (as I guess) somewhere given a Reason in my Book, by shewing that the *Term* *Notion* is more peculiarly appropriated to

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a certain sort of those Objects, which I call mixed Modes: And, I think, it would not sound altogether so well, to say, the *Notion of Red*, and the *Notion of a Horse*; as the *Idea of Red*, and the *Idea of a Horse*. But if any one thinks it will, I contend not; for I have no Fondness for, nor Antipathy to any particular Articulate Sounds: Nor do I think there is any Spell or Fascination, in any of them.

But be the Word *Idea* proper or improper, I do not see how it is the better or the worse, because *ill Men* have made use of it, or because it has been made use of to *bad Purposes*; for if that be a Reason to condemn, or lay it by, we must lay by the Terms of *Scripture*, *Reason*, *Perception*, *distinct*, *clear*, &c. nay, the Name of *God* himself will not scape; for I do not think any one of these, or any other Term, can be produced, which has not been made use of by such Men, and to such Purposes. And therefore, if the *Unitarians*, in their late Pamphlets, have talked very much of, and strangely amused the World, with *Ideas*; I cannot believe your Lordship will think

that Word one jot the worse, or the more dangerous, because they use it; any more than, for their use of them, you will think *Reason* or *Scripture*, Terms ill or dangerous. And therefore what your Lordship says, in the bottom of this 93d Page, That I *might have enjoyed the satisfaction of my Ideas long enough, before your Lordship had taken Notice of them, unless you had found them employed in doing Mischief;* will, I presume, when your Lordship has consider'd again of this Matter, prevail with your Lordship, to let me enjoy still the *Satisfaction I take in my Ideas*, i. e. as much Satisfaction as I can take in so small a Matter, as is the using of a proper Term, notwithstanding it *should be employ'd, by others, in doing Mischief.*

For, my Lord, if I should leave it wholly out of my Book, and substitute the Word *Notion* every where in the room of it; and every Body else do so too (though your Lordship does not, I suppose, suspect, that I have the Vanity to think they would follow my Example) my Book would, it seems, be the more to your Lordships liking: But I do not see how this would one jot

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abate the *Mischief*, your Lordship complains of. For the *Unitarians* might as much employ *Notions*, as they do now *Ideas*, to do *Mischief*; unless they are such Fools as to think, they can Conjure with this notable Word *Idea*; and that the force of what they say lies in the Sound, and not the Signification of their Terms.

This, I am sure, That the Truths of the Christian Religion, can be no more *batter'd* by one Word than another; nor can they be beaten down nor endangered, by any Sound whatsoever. And I am apt to flatter myself, that your Lordship is satisfied that there is no Harm in the Word *Ideas*, because you say you should not have taken any Notice of my *Ideas*, if the *Enemies of our Faith had not taken up my new way of Ideas, as an effectual Battery against the Mysteries of the Christian Faith.* In which place, by *new way of Ideas*, nothing, I think, can be construed to be meant, but my expressing myself by that of *Ideas*; and not by other more common Words, and of ancienter standing in the English Language.

My new way by Ideas, or *my way by Ideas*, which often occurs in your Lordships Letter, is, I confess, a very large and doubtful Expression ; and may, in the full Latitude, comprehend my whole *Essay* ; because treating in it of the *Understanding*, which is nothing but the Faculty of Thinking, I could not well treat of that Faculty of the Mind, which consists in Thinking, without considering the immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking, which I call *Ideas* : And therefore in treating of the *Understanding*, I guess it will not be thought strange, that the greatest part of my Book has been taken up, in considering what these Objects of the Mind, in Thinking, are ; whence they come ; what use the Mind makes of them, in its several ways of Thinking ; and what are the outward Marks, whereby it signifies them to others, or records them for its own use. And this, in short, is *my way by Ideas*, that which your Lordship calls *my new way by Ideas* : Which, my Lord, if it be *new*, it is but a new History of an old Thing. For I think it will not be doubted, that Men always perform'd the Actions of Thinking, Reasoning,

soning, Believing and Knowing, just after the same manner that they do now: Though whether the same Account has heretofore been given of the way how they performed these Actions, or wherein they consisted, I do not know. Were I as well read as your Lordship, I should have been safe from that gentle Reprimand of your Lordships, for thinking *my way of Ideas NEW*, for want of looking into other Mens Thoughts, which appear in their Books. P. 81.

Your Lordships Words, as an Acknowledgment of your Instructions in the Case; and as a Warning to others, who will be so bold Adventurers as to spin any Thing barely out of their own Thoughts; I shall set down, at large: And they run thus. *Whether you took this way of Ideas from the modern Philosopher, mentioned by you, is not at all material; but I intended no Reflection upon you in it, (for that you mean by my commending you as a Scholar of so great a Master) I never meant to take from you, the Honour of your own Inventions: And I do believe you, when you say, That you wrote from your own Thoughts, and the Ideas you had there. But many* P. 80.

many Things may seem New to one, that converses only with his own Thoughts, which really are not so; as he may find, when he looks into the Thoughts of other Men, which appear in their Books. And therefore, although I have a just Esteem for the Invention of such, who can spin Volumes barely out of their own Thoughts; yet I am apt to think, they would oblige the World more, if, after they have thought so much themselves, they would examine what Thoughts others have had before them, concerning the same Things; that so, those may not be thought their own Inventions, which are common to themselves and others. If a Man should try all the Magnetical Experiments himself, and publish them as his own Thoughts, he might take himself to be the Inventor of them: But he that examines and compares them with what Gibbert, and others have done before him, will not diminish the Praise of his Diligence, but may wish he had compared his Thoughts with other Mens; by which the World would receive greater Advantage, altho' he lost the Honour of being an Original.

To alleviate my Fault herein; I agree with your Lordship, That many Things may seem NEW, to one that

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converses only with his own Thoughts,
which really are not so: But I must
 crave leave to suggest to your Lord-
 ship, That if in the spinning of them
 out of his own Thoughts, they *seem*
new to him, he is certainly the Inven-
 tor of them; and they may as justly
 be thought *his own Invention*, as any
 ones; and he is as certainly the In-
 ventor of them, as any one who
 thought on them before him: The di-
 stinction of Invention, or not Inven-
 tion, lying not in thinking first, or
 not first, but in borrowing, or not
 borrowing, your Thoughts from ano-
 ther: And he to whom, spinning
 them out of his own Thoughts, they
seem new, could not certainly borrow
 them from another. So he truly in-
 vented Printing in *Europe*, who, with-
 out any Communication with the
Chineses, spun it out of his own
 Thoughts; though it were never so
 true, that the *Chineses* had the use of
 Printing, nay, of Printing in the very
 same way, among them, many Ages
 before him. So that he that spins any
 thing out of his own Thoughts, that
seems new to him, cannot cease to think
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it his own Invention, should he *examine* never so far *what Thoughts others have had before him, concerning the same Thing*; and should find, by examining, that they had the same Thoughts too.

But what great *Obligation this would be to the World*, or weighty Cause of turning over and looking into *Books*, I confess I do not see. The great End to me, in conversing with my own or other Mens Thoughts, in Matters of Speculation, is to find Truth, without being much concerned whether my own spinning of it out of mine, or their spinning of it out of their own Thought, helps me to it. And how little I affect the *Honour of an Original*, may be seen in that place of my Book, where, if any where, that Itch of Vain-glory was likeliest to have shewn it self; had I been so over-run with it, as to need a Cure. It is where I speak of Certainty, in these following Words, taken notice of by your Lordship, in another place: " I think I
 " have shewn wherein it is that Cer-
 " tainty, real Certainty, consists;
 " which, whatever it was to others,
 " was, I confess, to me heretofore,

" one

“ one of those *desiderata*, which I found
 “ great want of.

Here, my Lord, however *New* this
seem'd to me, and the more so because
 possibly I had in vain hunted for it in
 the *Books of others* ; yet, I spoke of it
 as *New*, only to my self ; leaving
others, in the undisturb'd possession of
 what either by Invention, or Reading,
 was theirs before ; without assuming
 to my self any other Honour, but that
 of my own Ignorance, till that time,
 if others before had shewn wherein
 Certainty lay. And yet, my Lord,
 if I had upon this occasion, been for-
 ward to assume to my self the *Honour*
of an Original, I think I had been
 pretty safe in it ; since I should have
 had your Lordship for my Guarantee
 and *Vindicator* in that Point, who are
 pleas'd to call it *New* ; and, as such,
 to write against it.

And truly, my Lord, in this re-
 spect, my Book has had very un-
 lucky Stars, since it hath had, the
 Misfortune to displease your Lordship,
 with many Things in it, for their No-
 velty ; as *New way of Reasoning* ; *New Vindic.*
Hypothesis about Reason ; *New sort of* p. 234.
Certainty ; *New Terms* ; *New way of* p. 240.
 Answ.

Ideas ; p. 23, 83.

P. 93. *Ideas; New Method of Certainty, &c.*
 And yet in other Places your Lordship
 seems to think, it worthy in me of
 your Lordships Reflection, for say-
 ing, but what others have said be-
 fore. As where I say, " In the dif-
 " ferent make of Mens Tempers and
 " application of their Thoughts, some
 " Arguments prevail more on one,
 " and some on another, for the Con-
 " firmation of the same Truth. Your

Vindicat.
 P. 249.

P. 23.

Lordship asks, *What is this different
 from what all Men of Understanding have
 said?* Agen, I take it, your Lordship
 meant not these Words for a Com-
 mendation of my Book, where you
 say; *But if no more be meant by* " the
 " Simple Ideas that come in by Sen-
 " sation or Reflection, and their be-
 " ing the Foundation of our Know-
 " ledge; *But that our Notions of Things
 come in, either from our Senses, or the
 Exercise of our Minds: As there is no-
 thing extraordinary in the Discovery,
 so your Lordship is far enough from op-
 posing that, wherein you think all Man-
 kind are agreed.*

P. 92.

And again, *But what need all this
 great noise about Ideas and Certainty,
 true and real Certainty by Ideas; if, af-*

ter all, it comes only to this, That our Ideas only represent to us such Things, from whence we bring Arguments to prove the Truth of Things?

And, *The World hath been strangely* P. 93. *amazed with Ideas of late; and we have been told, That strange Things might be done by the help of Ideas; and yet these Ideas, at last, come to be only common Notions of Things, which we must make use of in our Reasoning. And to the like Purpose, in other Places.*

Whether, therefore, at last, your Lordship will resolve, That it is *New* or no; or more faulty by its being *New*, must be left to your Lordship. This I find by it, That my Book cannot avoid being condemned on the one side, or the other; nor do I see a possibility to help it. If there be Readers that like only *New* Thoughts; or, on the other side, others that can bear nothing but what can be justified by received Authorities in Print, I must desire them to make themselves amends in that part which they like, for the displeasure they receive in the other: But if many should be so exact as to find Faults with both, truly I know not well

P. 35.

well what to say to them. The Case is a plain Case, the Book is all over naught and there is not a Sentence in it, that is not, either for its Antiquity or Novelty, to be condemned; and so there is a short end of it. From your Lordship indeed in particular, I can hope for something better; for your Lordship thinks the *general design of it so good*, that that, I flatter my Self, would prevail on your Lordship, to preserve it from the Fire.

But as to the way your Lordship thinks, I should have taken to prevent the *having it thought my Invention, when it was common to me with others*; it unluckily so fell out, in the Subject of my *Essay of Humane Understanding*, that I could not look into the Thoughts of other Men to inform my self. For my Design being, as well as I could, to copy Nature, and to give an account of the Operations of the Mind in Thinking, I could look into no Bodies Understanding but my own, to see how it wrought; nor have a Prospect into other Mens Minds to view their Thoughts there, and observe what Steps and Motions they took, and by what Gradations they proceed-

ed in their acquainting themselves with Truth, and their advance to Knowledge. What we find of their Thoughts in Books, is but the result of this, and not the progress and working of their Minds, in coming to the Opinions or Conclusions they set down and published.

All therefore, that I can say of my Book, is, That it is a Copy of my own Mind, in its several ways of Operation. And all that I can say for the publishing of it, is, That I think the intellectual Faculties are made, and operate alike in most Men; and that some, that I shewed it to before I published it, liked it so well, that I was confirmed in that Opinion. And therefore, if it should happen, that it should not be so, but that some Men should have ways of Thinking, Reasoning, or arriving at Certainty, different from others, and above those that I find my Mind to use and acquiesce in, I do not see of what use my Book can be to them. I can only make it my humble Request, in my own Name, and in the Name of those that are of my Size, who find their Minds Work, Reason, and Know in the same

low way that mine does, That those Men of a more happy Genius, would show us the way of their nobler Flights; and particularly would discover to us their shorter or surer way to Certainty, than by Ideas, and the observing their Agreement or Disagreement.

In the mean time, I must acknowledge, That if I had been guilty of affecting to be thought an *Original*, a Correction could not have come from any Body so disinterested in the Case, as your Lordship; since your Lordship so much declines being thought an *Original*, for writing in a way, wherein it is hard to avoid thinking that you are the first, till some other can be produced that writ so before You.

But to return to your Lordships present Charge against my Book. In the 38th Page of your Lordships Answer, I find these Words: *In an Age, wherein the Mysteries of Faith are so much exposed, by the Promoters of Scepticism and Infidelity; it is a Thing of dangerous Consequence, to start such new Methods of Certainty, as are apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before.*

By which Passage, and some Expressions

sions that seem to look that way, in the Places above quoted ; I take it for granted, that another Particular, in my Book, which your Lordship suspects *may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend*, is my placing of Certainty as I do, in the Preception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas.

Though I cannot conceive how any Term, *new* or old ; *Idea*, or not *Idea*, can have any Opposition or Danger in it, to any *Article of Faith*, or any Truth whatsoever ; yet I easily grant, That Propositions are capable of being opposite to Propositions, and may be such, as if granted, may *overthrow Articles of Faith*, or any other Truth they are opposite to. But your Lordship not having, as I remember, shewn, or gone about to shew, how this Proposition, *viz.* That Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas, is opposite or inconsistent with *that Article of Faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend* : 'Tis plain, 'tis but your Lordships Fear, that it *may be of dangerous Consequence to it* ;

which, as I humbly conceive, is no Proof that it is any way inconsistent to that Article.

No Body, I think, can blame your Lordship, or any one else, for being concerned for any Article of the Christian Faith: But if that Concern (as it may, and as we know it has done) make any one apprehend Danger, where no Danger is; are we, therefore, to give up and condemn any Proposition, because any one, though of the first Rank and Magnitude, fears *it may be of dangerous Consequence* to any Truth of Religion, without shewing that it is so? If such Fears be the Measures whereby to judge of Truth and Falshood, the affirming that there are Antipodes would be still a Heresie; and the Doctrin of the Motion of the Earth, must be rejected, as overthrowing the Truth of the Scripture: For of that *dangerous Consequence* it has been apprehended to be, by many learned and pious Divines, out of their great Concern for Religion. And yet, notwithstanding those great Apprehensions of *what dangerous Consequence it might be*, it is now universally received
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by Learned Men, as an undoubted Truth; and writ for by some, whose Belief of the Scriptures is not at all questioned; and particularly, very lately, by a Divine of the Church of England, with great Strength of Reason, in his wonderfully ingenious *New Theory of the Earth*.

The Reason your Lordship gives of your Fears, That *it may be of such dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith, which your Lordship endeavours to defend*, though it occur in more Places than one, is only this, *viz.* That it is *made use of by ill Men to do Mischief, i. e.* to oppose that Article of Faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend. But, my Lord, if it be a Reason to lay by any Thing, as bad, because it is, or may be used to an ill Purpose, I know not what will be innocent enough to be kept. Arms, which were made for our Defence, are sometimes made use of to do *Mischief*; and yet they are not thought of *dangerous Consequence* for all that. No Body lays by his Sword and Pistols, or thinks them of such *dangerous Consequence* as to be neglected, or thrown away, because

Robbers, and the worst of Men, sometimes make use of them, to take away honest Mens Lives or Goods. And the Reason is, because they were designed, and will serve to preserve them. And who knows but this may be the present Case? If your Lordship thinks, that placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, be to be rejected as false, because you apprehend it *may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith*; on the other side, perhaps others, with me, may think it a Defence against Error, and so (as being of good use) to be received and adhered to.

I would not, my Lord, be hereby thought to set up my own, or any ones Judgment against your Lordships: But I have said this only to shew, while the Argument lies for or against the Truth of any Proposition, barely in an Imagination, that *it may be of Consequence to the supporting or overthrowing of any remote Truth*; it will be impossible, that way, to determine of the Truth or Falshood of that Proposition. For Imagination will be set up against Imagination,
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and the stronger probably will be against your Lordship; the strongest Imaginations being usually in the weakest Heads. The only way, in this Case, to put it past Doubt, is to shew the Inconsistency of the two Propositions; and then it will be seen, that one overthrows the other; the true the false one.

Your Lordship says indeed, This is a *New Method of Certainty*. I will not say so my self, for fear of deserving a second Reproof from your Lordship, for being too forward to assume to my self the *Honour of being an Original*. But this, I think, gives me occasion, and will excuse me from being thought Impertinent, if I ask your Lordship, Whether there be any other or older *Method of Certainty*? and what it is? For if there be no other, nor older than this, either this was always the *Method of Certainty*, and so mine is no *New* one; or else the World is obliged to me for this *New* one, after having been so long in the want of so necessary a Thing, as a *Method of Certainty*. If there be an older, I am sure your Lordship cannot but know it; your condemn-

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ing mine as *New*, as well as your through Insight into Antiquity, cannot but satisfy every Body that you do. And therefore to set the World right, in a Thing of that great Concernment, and to overthrow mine, and thereby prevent the *dangerous Consequence* there is in my having unreasonably *started* it, will not, I humbly conceive, misbecome your Lordships Care of *that Article you have endeavoured to defend*, nor the good Will you bear to Truth in general. For I will be answerable for my self, that I shall: And I think I may be for all others, that they all will, give off the placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, if your Lordship will be pleased to shew, that it lies in any Thing else.

But truly, not to ascribe to my self an Invention, of what has been as old as Knowledge is in the World, I must own, I am not guilty of what your Lordship is pleased to call *Starting new Methods of Certainty*. Knowledge, ever since there has been any in the World, has consisted in one particular Action of the Mind; and so, I

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conceive, will continue to do to the end of it : And to *Start new Methods of Knowledge or Certainty*, (for they are to me the same thing) *i.e.* to find out and propose new Methods of attaining Knowledge, either with more Ease and Quickness , or in Things yet unknown, is what I think no Body could blame: But this is not that which your Lordship here means, by *New Methods of Certainty*. Your Lordship, I think, means by it, the placing of *Certainty* in something , wherein either it does not consist, or else wherein it was not placed before now ; if this be to be called a *New Method of Certainty*. As to the latter of these, I shall know whether I am guilty or no, when your Lordship will do me the Favour to tell me , wherein it was placed before : Which your Lordship knows I professed my self ignorant of, when I writ my Book, and so am still. But if *Starting of new Methods of Certainty*, be the placing of *Certainty* in something wherein it does not consist ; whether I have done that or no, I must appeal to the Experience of Mankind.

There

There are several Actions of Mens Minds, that they are conscious to themselves of performing, as *Willing*, *Believing*, *Knowing*, &c. which they have so particular a Sense of, that they can distinguish them one from another ; or else they could not say when they *Willed*, when they *Believed*, and when they *Knew* any Thing. But though these Actions were different enough from one another, not to be confounded by those who spoke of them, yet no Body, that I had met with, had, in their Writings, particularly set down wherein the Act of *Knowing* precisely consisted.

To this Reflection, upon the Actions of my own Mind, the Subject of my *Essay concerning Humane Understanding* naturally led me ; wherein, if I have done any Thing *New*, it has been to describe to others, more particularly than had been done before, what it is their Minds do, when they perform that Action which they call *Knowing* ; and if, upon Examination, they observe, I have given a true Account of that Action of their Minds in all the parts of it ; I suppose it will be in vain to dispute against

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against what they find and feel in themselves. And if I have not told them right, and exactly what they find and feel in themselves, when their Minds perform the Act of Knowing, what I have said will be all in vain; Men will not be persuaded against their Senses. Knowledge is an Internal Perception of their Minds; and if, when they reflect on it, they find it is not what I have said it is, my groundless Conceit will not be hearken'd to, but be exploded by every Body, and die of it self: And no Body need to be at any Pains to drive it out of the World. So impossible is it to find out, or *Start new Methods of Certainty*, or to have them received, if any one places it in any Thing but in that wherein it really consists: Much less can any one be in danger to be misled into Error, by any such *new*, and to every one visibly senseless Project. Can it be supposed, That any one could *Start a new Method of Seeing*, and persuade Men thereby, that they do not see what they do see? Is it to be fear'd, That any one can cast such a Mist over their Eyes, that they should not know

know when they see, and so be led out of their Way by it?

Knowledge I find in my self; and, I conceive in others, consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking, which I call *Ideas*: But whether it does so in others or no, must be determin'd by their own Experience, reflecting upon the Action of their Mind in Knowing; for that I cannot alter, nor I think they themselves. But whether they will call those immediate Objects of their Minds, in thinking *Ideas* or no, is perfectly in their own Choice. If they dislike that Name, they may call them *Notions* or *Conceptions*, or how they please; it matters not, if they use them so as to avoid Obscurity and Confusion. If they are constantly used in the same and a known Sense, every one has the liberty to please himself in his *Terms*, there lies neither Truth, nor Error, nor Science, in that; though those that take them for Things, and not for what they are, bare arbitrary Signs of our *Ideas*, make a great deal of Do often about them; as if some great Matter lay
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in the use of this or that Sound. All that I know or can imagine of difference, about them, is, That those Words are always best, whose Significations are best known in the Sense they are used ; and so are least apt to breed Confusion.

My Lord, your Lordship has been pleased to find Fault with my use of the new *Term Ideas*, without telling me a better Name for the immediate Objects of the Mind in 'Thinking. Your Lordship has also been pleased to find Fault with my Definition of Knowledge, without doing me the Favour to give me a better. For it is only about my Definition of Knowledge, that all this Stir, concerning *Certainty*, is made. For with me, to know and be certain, is the same thing ; what I know, that I am certain of ; and what I am certain of, that I know. What reaches to Knowledge, I think may be called *Certainty* ; and what comes short of *Certainty*, I think cannot be called Knowledge ; as your Lordship could not but observe in the 18th §. of Ch. 4. of my 4th Book, which you have quoted

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My Definition of Knowledge, in the beginning of the 4th Book of my *Essay*, stands thus. " Knowledge " seems, to me, to be nothing but " the Perception of the Connection, " and Agreement, or Dis-agreement, " and Repugnancy of any of our Ideas. This Definition your Lordship dislikes, and apprehends *it may be of dangerous Consequence as to that Article of Christian Faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend.* For this there is a very easie Remedy: It is but for your Lordship to set *aside* this Definition of Knowledge, by giving us a better, and this Danger is over. But your Lordship chooses rather to have a Controversie with my Book, for having it in it, and to put me upon the Defence of it; for which I must acknowledge my self obliged to your Lordship, for affording me so much of your Time, and for allowing me the Honour of Converseing so much, with one so far above me in all Respects.

Your Lordship says, *It may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of Christian Faith, which you have endeavoured to defend.* Though the Laws of

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of Disputing allow bare Denial as a sufficient Answer to Sayings, without any Offer of a Proof; yet, my Lord, to shew how willing I am to give your Lordship all Satisfaction, in what you apprehend may be of *dangerous Consequence* in my Book, as to *that Article*, I shall not stand still sullenly, and put your Lordship upon the difficulty of shewing wherein that Danger lies; but shall, on the other side, endeavour to shew your Lordship that that Definition of mine, whether true or false, right or wrong, can be of no *dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith*. The Reason which I shall offer for it, is this; Because it can be of no Consequence to it at all.

That which your Lordship is afraid it may be *dangerous* to, is an *Article of Faith*: That which your Lordship labours and is *concerned* for, is the *Certainty of Faith*. Now, my Lord, I humbly conceive the *Certainty of Faith*, if your Lordship thinks fit to call it so, has nothing to do with the *Certainty of Knowledge*. And to talk of the *Certainty of Faith*, seems all one to me, as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing,

lieving ; a way of speaking not easie to me to understand.

Place Knowledge in what you will, *start what new Methods of Certainty* you please, *that are apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before* ; place Certainty on such Grounds, as will leave little or no Knowledge in the World. For these are the Arguments your Lordship uses against my Definition of Knowledge ; this shakes not at all, nor in the least concerns the assurance of Faith ; that is quite distinct from it, neither stands nor falls with Knowledge.

Faith stands by it self, and upon Grounds of its own ; nor can be removed from them, and placed on those of Knowledge. Their Grounds are so far from being the same, or having any Thing common, that when it is brought to *Certainty*, *Faith* is destroy'd ; 'tis Knowledge then, and Faith no longer.

With what assurance soever of Believing, I assent to any *Article of Faith*, so that I stedfastly venture my All upon it, it is still but *Believing*. Bring it to *Certainty*, and it ceases to be *Faith*. I believe, That Jesus Christ was crucified,

cified, dead and buried, rose again the third Day from the Dead, and ascended into Heaven: Let now *such Methods* of Knowledge or *Certainty*, be started, as leave *Mens Minds* more doubtful than before: Let the Grounds of Knowledge be resolved into what any one pleases, it touches not my *Faith*; the Foundation of that stands as sure as before, and cannot be at all shaken by it; and one may as well say, That any thing that weakens the Sight, or casts a Mist before the Eyes, endangers the Hearing; as that any thing which alters the nature of Knowledge (if that could be done) should be of dangerous Consequence to an Article of *Faith*.

Whether then I am or am not mistaken, in the placing *Certainty* in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas; whether this account of Knowledge be true or false, enlarges or straitens the Bounds of it more than it should; *Faith* still stands upon its own Basis, which is not at all alter'd by it; and every Article of that has just the same unmoved Foundation, and the very same Credibility, that it had before. So that, my Lord, what-

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ever I have said about *Certainty*, and how much soever I may be out in it, if I am mistaken, your Lordship has no Reason to apprehend any *Danger*, to any *Article of Faith*, from thence; every one of them stands, upon the same Bottom it did before, out of the reach of what belongs to Knowledge and *Certainty*. And thus much of my *way of Certainty by Ideas*; which, I hope, will satisfy your Lordship, how far it is from being *dangerous to any Article of the Christian Faith* whatsoever.

P. 103.

I find one Thing more your Lordship charges on me, in reference to the *Unitarian Controversie*; and that is where your Lordship says, That if *these [i. e. my Notions of Nature and Person] hold, your Lordship does not see how it is possible to defend the Doctrin of the Trinity.*

My Lord, since I have a great Opinion that your Lordship sees as far as any one, and I should be justified to the World, in relying upon your Lordships Foresight more than on any ones; these discomfoting Words of your Lordships, would dishearten me so, that I should be ready to give up what your Lordship confesses so untenable;

nible ; with this Acknowledgment however to your Lordship, as its great Defender,

———*Si Pergama dextra,
Defendi possint etiam hac defensa fuissent.*

This, I say, after such a Declaration of your Lordships, I should think, out of a due value of your Lordships great Penetration and Judgment, I had Reason to do, were it in any other Cause but that of an *Article of the Christian Faith*. For these, I am sure, shall all be defended and stand firm to the Worlds end, though we are not always sure, what Hand shall defend them. I know as much may be expected from your Lordships in the Case, as any Body's ; and therefore I conclude, when you have taken a View of this Matter again, out of the Heat of Dispute, you will have a better Opinion of the *Articles of the Christian Faith*, and of your own Ability to defend them, than to pronounce, That if *my Notions of Nature and Person hold*, your Lordship cannot see how it is possible to defend that *Article of the Christian Faith*, which your Lordship has endeavoured to

defend. For 'tis, methinks, to put that Article upon a very ticklish Issue, and to render it as suspected and as doubtful as is possible to Mens Minds, that your Lordship should declare it not possible to be defended, if *my Notions of Nature and Person* hold; when all that I can find that your Lordship excepts against, in my *Notions of Nature and Person*, is nothing but this, *viz.* That these are two Sounds, which in themselves signify nothing.

But before I come to examine how by *Nature and Person* your Lordship, at present in your Answer, engages me in the *Unitarian* Controversie; it will not be besides the Matter to consider, how by them your Lordship at first brought my Book into it.

Vindicat.
p. 252.

In your *Vindication of the Doctrin of the Trinity*, your Lordship says; *The next Thing to be cleared in THIS DISPUTE, is the distinction between Nature and Person. And of this we can have no clear and distinct Idea from Sensation or Reflection: And yet all our Notions of the Doctrin of the Trinity, depend upon the right understanding of it. For we must talk unintelligibly about this Point, unless we have clear and distinct*
Ap-

Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person, and the Grounds of Identity and Distinction. But that these come not into our Minds, by these simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection.

To this I reply'd; " If it be so, the P. 148

" Inference I should draw from thence
 " (if it were fit for me to draw any)
 " would be this, That it concerns
 " those who write on that Subject, to
 " have themselves, and to lay down
 " to others, clear and distinct Appre-
 " hensions, or Notions, or Ideas (call
 " them what you please) of what
 " they mean by *Nature* and *Person*,
 " and of the Grounds of Identity and
 " Distinction.

" This seems, to me, the natural
 " Conclusion flowing from your Lord-
 " ships Words; which seem here to
 " suppose clear and distinct Apprehen-
 " sions (something like clear and di-
 " stinct Ideas) necessary for the avoid-
 " ing unintelligible Talk in the Do-
 " ctrin of the Trinity. But I do not
 " see your Lordship can, from the
 " Necessity of clear and distinct Ap-
 " prehensions of *Nature* and *Per-
 " son*, &c. in the dispute of the Tri-
 " nity, bring in one, who has perhaps

“ mistaken the way to clear and di-
 “ stinct Notions concerning *Nature*
 “ and *Person*, &c. as fit to be an-
 “ swer’d among those, who bring
 “ Objections against the Trinity in
 “ Point of Reason. I do not see why
 “ an *Unitarian* may not as well bring
 “ him in, and argue against his *Essay*,
 “ in a Chapter that he should write,
 “ to answer Objections against the
 “ Unity of God, in point of Reason
 “ or Revelation: For upon what
 “ Ground soever any one writes, in
 “ this Dispute or any other, it is not
 “ tolerable to talk unintelligibly on
 “ either side.

“ If by the way of Ideas, which is
 “ that of the Author of the *Essay of*
 “ *Humane Understanding*, a Man can-
 “ not come to clear and distinct Ap-
 “ prehensions concerning *Nature* and
 “ *Person*; if, as he proposes from the
 “ simple Ideas of Sensation and Refle-
 “ ction, such Apprehensions cannot
 “ be got; it will follow from thence,
 “ that he is a mistaken Philosopher:
 “ But it will not follow from thence,
 “ That he is not an Orthodox Chri-
 “ stian; for he might (as he did)
 “ write his *Essay of Humane Under-*
 “ *standing*,

“ *standing*, without any Thought of
“ the Controversie between the *Trini-*
“ *tarians* and the *Unitarians*. Nay, a
“ Man might have writ all that is in
“ his Book, that never heard one Word
“ of any such Dispute.

“ There is in the World a great and fierce Contest about *Nature* and *Grace*: ’Twould be very hard for me, if I must be brought in as a Party on either side, because a Disputant in that Controversie should think, the clear and distinct Apprehensions of *Nature* and *Grace* come not into our Minds by these simple Ideas of *Sensation* and *Reflection*. If this be so, I may be reckon’d among the Objectors against all Sorts and Points of Orthodoxy, when-ever any one pleases: I may be called to Account as one Heterodox, in the Points of Free-grace, Free-will, Predestination, Original Sin, Justification by Faith, Transubstantiation, the Pope’s Supremacy, and what not? as well as in the Doctrin of the Trinity; and all because they cannot be furnished with clear and distinct Notions of Grace, Free-will, Transubstantia-

“tion,

" tion, &c. by Sensation or Refle-
 " ction. For in all these, or any other
 " Points, I do not see but there may be
 " a Complaint made, That they have
 " not always a right Understanding
 " and clear Notions of those Things,
 " on which the Doctrin they dispute
 " of depends. And 'tis not altogether
 " unusual for Men to talk unintelligi-
 " bly to themselves, and others, in
 " these and other Points in Contro-
 " versie, for want of *clear and distinct*
 " *Apprehensions*, or (as I would call
 " them did not your Lordship dislike
 " it) *Ideas*: For all which unintelligi-
 " ble Talking, I do not think my self
 " accountable, though it should so
 " fall out, that my way by *Ideas*
 " would not help them to what it
 " seems is wanting, clear and distinct
 " Notions. If my way be ineffectual
 " to that purpose, they may, for all
 " me, make use of any other more
 " successful; and leave me out of the
 " Controversie, as one useles to either
 " Party, for deciding of the Que-
 " stion.

" Supposing, as your Lordship says,
 " and as you have undertaken to make
 " appear, That the clear and distinct
 " Ap-

“ Apprehensions concerning *Nature*
 “ and *Person*, and the Grounds of
 “ Identity and Distinction, should
 “ not come into the Mind by simple
 “ Ideas of Sensation and Reflection;
 “ What, I beseech your Lordship, is
 “ this to the Dispute concerning the
 “ Trinity, on either side? And if,
 “ after your Lordship has endeavour’d
 “ to give clear and distinct Apprehen-
 “ sions of *Nature* and *Person*, the Dis-
 “ putants in this Controversie, should
 “ still talk unintelligibly about this
 “ Point, for want of clear and dis-
 “ tinct Apprehensions concerning *Na-*
 “ *ture* and *Person*; ought your Lord-
 “ ship to be brought in among the
 “ Partisans on the other side, by any
 “ one who writ a *Vindication of the*
 “ *Doctrin of the Trinity*? In good
 “ earnest, my Lord, I do not see how
 “ the *clear and distinct* Notions of *Na-*
 “ *ture and Person*, not coming into
 “ the Mind by the simple Ideas of Sen-
 “ sation and Reflection, any more
 “ contains any Objection against the
 “ Doctrin of the Trinity; than the
 “ clear and distinct Apprehensions of
 “ Original Sin, Justification or Tran-
 “ substantiation, not coming into the
 “ Mind

“ Mind by the simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection, contains any
 “ Objection against the Doctrin of
 “ Original Sin, Justification or Transubstantiation: And so of all the rest
 “ of the Terms used in any Controversie in Religion.

Answ.
 p. 100.

All that your Lordship answers to this, is in these Words. *The next Thing I undertook to shew, was, That we can have no clear and distinct Idea of Nature and Person, from Sensation or Reflection. Here you spend many Pages to shew, that this doth not concern you. Let it be so. But it concerns the Matter I was upon; which was to shew, That we must have Ideas [I think, my Lord, it should be clear and distinct Ideas] of these Things, which we cannot come to by Sensation and Reflection.*

But be that as it will; I have troubled your Lordship here, with this large Repetition out of my former Letter, because I think it clearly shews, That my Book is no more concerned in the Controversie about the Trinity, than any other Controversie extant; nor any more opposite to that side of the Question, that your Lordship has endeavoured to defend, than to the

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contrary: And also because, by your Lordships Answer to it in these Words, *Let it be so*, I thought you had not only agreed to all that I had said, but that by it I had been dismissed out of that Controversie.

It is an Observation I have somewhere met with, That whoever is once got into the Inquisition, Guilty or not Guilty, seldom ever gets clear out again. I think your Lordship is satisfied there is no Heresie in my Book. The Suspicion it was brought into, upon the account of placing *Certainty only upon clear and distinct Ideas*, is found groundless, there being no such Thing in my Book; and yet it is not dismissed out of the Controversie. 'Tis alledged still, That *my Notion of Ideas, as I have stated it, may be of dangerous Consequence as to that Article of the Christian Faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend*; and so I am bound over to another Trial. *Clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person, and the Grounds of Identity and Distinction, so necessary in the Dispute of the Trinity, cannot be had from Sensation and Reflection*; was another Accusation. To this, whether
true

true or false, I pleaded, That it makes me no Party in this Dispute of the Trinity, more than in any Dispute that can arise; nor of one side of the Question, more than another. My Plea is allowed, *Let it be so*; and yet *Nature* and *Person* are made use of again, to hook me into the Heretical Side of the Dispute; and what is now the Charge against me, in reference to the *Unitarian* Controversie, upon the account of *Nature* and *Person*, even this new one, *viz.* 'That if my *Notions of Nature and Person* hold, your Lordship does not see how it is possible to defend the *Doctrin of the Trinity*. How is this new Charge proved? Even thus, in these Words annexed to it. *For if these Terms really signify nothing in themselves, but are only abstract and complex Ideas, which the common use of Language hath appropriated to be the Signs of two Ideas; then it is plain, that they are only Notions of the Mind, as all abstracted and complex Ideas are; and so One Nature and Three Persons can be no more.*

P. 103.

My Lord, I am not so conceited of my *Notions*, as to think that they deserve that your Lordship should dwell

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long upon the Consideration of them. But pardon me, my Lord, if I say, That it seems to me, that this Representation which your Lordship here makes to your self, of *my Notions of Nature and Person*, and the Inference from it, were made a little in haste: And that if it had not been so, your Lordship would not, from the preceding Words, have drawn this Conclusion, *And so One Nature and Three Persons can be no more*; nor charg'd it upon me.

For as to that part of your Lordships representation of my Notions of *Nature and Person*, wherein 'tis said, *If these Terms in themselves signifie nothing*; though I grant that to be my Notion of the Terms *Nature and Person*, That they are two Sounds that naturally signifie not one Thing more than another, nor in themselves signifie any Thing at all, but have the signification, which they have, barely by Imposition: Yet, in this *my Notion* of them, give me leave to presume, That upon more leisurly Thoughts I shall have your Lordship, as well as the rest of Mankind that ever thought of this Matter, concurring with me. So
that

that if your Lordship continues positive in it, That *you cannot see how it is possible to defend the Doctrin of the Trinity, if this my Notion of Nature and Person hold*; I, as far as my Eye-sight will reach in the Case (which possibly is but a little way) cannot see, but it will be plain to all Mankind, that your Lordship gives up the *Doctrin of the Trinity*: Since this *Notion of Nature and Person* that they are two Words, that signifie by Imposition, is what *will hold* in the common Sense of all Mankind. And then, my Lord, all those who think well of your Lordships Ability to defend it, and believe that you see as far into that Question as any Body (which I take to be the common Sentiment of all the Learned World, especially of those of our Country and Church) will be in great Danger to have an ill Opinion of the Evidence of that Article: Since, I imagine, there is scarce one of them, who does not think this *Notion* will hold, viz. That these Terms *Nature* and *Person*, signifie what they do signifie by Imposition, and not by Nature.

Tho'

Tho', if the contrary were true, *viz.* That these two Words *Nature* and *Person* had this particular Priviledge, above other Names of Things, that they did naturally and in themselves signifie what they do signifie, and that they received not their Significations from the arbitrary Imposition of Men, I do not see how the Defence of the *Doctrin of the Trinity* should depend hereon: Unless your Lordship concludes, that it is necessary to the Defence of the *Doctrin of the Trinity*, That these two articulate Sounds should have natural Significations; and that unless they are used in those Significations, it were impossible to defend the *Doctrin of the Trinity*. Which is in effect to say, That where these two Words are not, in Use and in their natural Signification, the *Doctrin of the Trinity* cannot be defended. And if this be so, I grant your Lordship had Reason to say, That if it hold, that the Terms *Nature* and *Person* signifie by Imposition, your Lordship does not see how it is possible to defend the *Doctrin of the Trinity*. But then, my Lord, I beg your Lordship to consider, Whether this be
not

not mightily to prejudice that Doctrine, and to undermine the Belief of that Article of Faith, to make so extraordinary a Supposition necessary to the Defence of it ; and of *more dangerous Consequence to it*, than any Thing your Lordship can imagine deducible from my Book?

As to the remaining part of what your Lordship has, in the fore-going Passage, set down as some of my Notions of *Nature and Person*, viz. That *these Terms are only abstract or complex Ideas*. I crave leave to plead, That I never said any such Thing ; and I should be asham'd if I ever had said, That *these*, or any other *Terms*, were *Ideas* : Which is all one as to say, that the Sign is the Thing signified. Much less did I ever say, That *these Terms are only abstract and complex Ideas, which the common Use of Language hath appropriated to be the Signs of two Ideas*. For to say, That *the common Use of Language has appropriated abstract and complex Ideas to be the Signs of Ideas*, seems to me so extraordinary a way of Talking, that I can scarce persuade my self it would be of Credit to your Lordship,

ship, to think it worth your while to answer a Man, whom you could suppose to vent such gross Jargon.

This therefore containing none of my *Notions of Nature and Person*, nor indeed any Thing that I understand; whether your Lordship rightly deduces from it this Consequence, *viz. And so One Nature and Three Persons can be no more*, is what I neither know nor am concerned to examin.

Your Lordship has been pleased to take my *Essay of Humane Understanding* to Task, in your *Vindication of the Vindicat. Doctrin of the Trinity*; because the *P. 252.* Doctrin of it, will not furnish your Lordship with *clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person, and the Grounds of Identity and Distinction.* For, says your Lordship, *we must talk unintelligibly about this Point, [of the Trinity] unless we have clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person, &c.*

Whether, by my way of Ideas, one can have clear and distinct Apprehensions of *Nature and Person*, I shall not now dispute; how much soever I am of the Mind one may. Nor, shall I question the reasonableness of this

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Principle your Lordship goes upon, viz. That my Book is to be disputed against, as opposite to the *Doctrin of the Trinity*, because it fails to furnish your Lordship with *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person, and the Distinction between them*; though I promised no such *clear and distinct Apprehensions*, nor have treated in my Book any where of *Nature* at all. But upon this occasion I cannot but observe, That your Lordship your self, in that place, makes *clear and distinct Ideas necessary to that Certainty of Faith*, which your Lordship thinks requisite, though it be that very Thing for which you blame *the Men of the new way of Reasoning*; and is the very Ground of your disputing against the *Unitarians*, the Author of *Christianity not Myste-rious*, and Me, jointly under that Title.

Your Lordship, to supply that Defect in my Book, of *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person*, for the Vindication of the Doctrin of the Trinity, without which it cannot be talked of intelligibly nor defended, undertook to *clear the Distinction between Nature and Person*. This, I told your Lord-

Lordship, gave me hopes of getting farther Insight into these Matters, and more *clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person*, than was to be had by *Ideas*; But that, after all the Attention and Application I could use, in reading what your Lordship had writ of it, I found my self so little inlightned concerned *Nature* or *Person*, by what your Lordship had said, that I found no other Remedy, but that I must be *content with the condemned way by Ideas*.

This, which I thought not only an innocent, but a respectful Answer, to what your Lordship had said about *Nature and Person*, has drawn upon P. 125; me a more severe Reflection, than I thought it deserved. *Scepticism* is a pretty hard Word, which I find dropt in more Places than one; but I shall refer the Consideration of that to another Place. All that I shall do now, shall be to mark out (since your Lordship forces me to it) more particularly than I did before, what I think very hard to be understood, in that which your Lordship has said to *clear the Distinction between Nature and Person*; which I shall do, for these two Ends.

First, As an Excuse for my saying,
 “ That I had learnt nothing out of
 “ your Lordships elaborate Discourse
 “ of them, but this ; That I must con-
 “ tent my self with my condemned
 “ way by Ideas.

And next to shew, why not only I,
 but several others, think, That if my
 Book deserv'd to be brought in, and
 taken notice of among the *Anti-trini-*
tarian Writers , for want of *clear and*
distinct Ideas of *Nature* and *Person* ;
 what your Lordship has said upon
 these Subjects, will more justly de-
 serve, by him that writes next in *De-*
fence of the Doctrin of the Trinity, to be
 brought in among the Opposers of the
 Doctrin of the Trinity, *as of dangerous*
Consequence to it, for want of giving
clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature
and Person ; unless the same Thing
 ranks one Man among the *Unitarians*,
 and another amongst the *Trinita-*
rians.

What your Lordship had said, for
 clearing of the *Distinction of Nature*
and Person, having surpass'd my Un-
 derstanding, as I told your Lordship
 in my former Letter ; I was resolv'd
 not to incur your Lordships Displea-
 sure

sure a second time, by confessing, I found not my self inlightened by it, till I had taken all the Help, I could imagin, to find out these *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person*, which your Lordship had so much declared for. To this purpose, I consulted others upon what you had said; and desired to find some Body, who understanding it himself, would help me out, where my own Application and Endeavours had been used to no purpose. But my Misfortune has been, my Lord, That among several whom I have desired to tell me their Sense of what your Lordship has said, for *clearing* the Notions of *Nature and Person*, there has not been one who owned, that he understood your Lordships meaning: But confessed, the farther he looked into what your Lordship had there said, about *Nature and Person*, the more he was at a loss about them.

One said, Your Lordship began with giving two Significations of the Word *Nature*. One of them, as it stood for *Properties*, he said he understood. Vindicat.
 But the other, wherein *Nature* p. 252.
was taken for the Thing it self, wherein

those Properties were, he said, he did not understand. But that, he added, I was not to wonder at, in a Man who was not very well acquainted with Greek; and therefore might well be allowed not to have Learning enough to understand an English Word, that *Aristotle* was brought to explain and settle the Sense of. Besides, he added, That which puzzel'd him the more in it, was the very Explication which was brought of it out of *Aristotle*, viz. That *Nature* was a *Corporeal Substance*, which had the *Principles of Motion in it self*; because he could not conceive a *Corporeal Substance*, having the *Principles of Motion in it self*: And if *Nature* were a *Corporeal Substance*, having the *Principles of Motion in it self*; it must be good Sense to say, That a *Corporeal Substance*, or, which is the same Thing, a *Body having the Principles of Motion in it self*, is *Nature*; which he confessed, if any Body should say to him, he could not understand.

Another Thing, he said, that perplexed him in this Explication of *Nature*, was, That if *Nature* was a *Corporeal Substance*, which had the *Principles of Motion in it self*, he thought it might

might happen that there might be no *Nature* at all. For *Corporeal Substances* having all equally Principles, or no Principles, of Motion in themselves; and all Men who do not make Matter and Motion eternal, being positive in it, that a Body, at rest, has no Principle of Motion in it; must conclude, That *Corporeal Substance has no Principle of Motion in it self*. From hence it will follow, That to all those who admit not Matter and Motion to be eternal, no *Nature*, in that Sense, will be left at all, since *Nature* is said to be a *Corporeal Substance, which hath the Principles of Motion in it self*; but such a sort of *Corporeal Substance* those Men have no Notion of at all, and consequently none of *Nature*, which is such a *Corporeal Substance*.

Now, said he, if this be that *clear and distinct Apprehension of Nature*, which is so necessary to the Doctrine of the Trinity; they who have found it out for that purpose, and find it *clear and distinct*, have Reason to be satisfied with it upon that account: But how they will reconcile it to the Creation of Matter, I cannot tell. I, for my part, said he, can make it consist nei-

ther with the Creation of the World, nor with any any other Notions ; and so, plainly , cannot understand it.

Vindic.
P. 252.

He further said , in the following Words, which are these , *But Nature and Substance are of an equal Extent ; and so that which is the Subject of Powers and Properties is the Nature, whether it be meant of Bodily or Spiritual Substances,* he neither understood the Connection nor Sense. First, he understood not, he said , That *Nature and Substance were of the same Extent.* *Nature*, he said, in his Notion of it, extended to Things that were not Substances ; as he thought it might properly be said, the Nature of a Rectangular Triangle was, That the Square of the Hypoteneuse, was equal to the Square of the two other sides ; or, it is the *Nature* of Sin, to offend God : Though it be certain, That neither *Sin*, nor a *Rectangular Triangle*, to which *Nature* is attributed in these Propositions, are either of them *Substances*.

Further, he said, That he did not see how the Particle *but*, connects this to the preceding Words. But least of all could, he comprehend the Inference

rence from hence. *And so that which is the Subject of Powers and Properties is Nature, whether it be meant of Bodily or Spiritual Substances.* Which Deduction, said he, stands thus. *Aristotle takes Nature for a Corporeal Substance, which has the Principle of Motion in it self; therefore Nature and Substance are of an equal Extent, and so both Corporeal and Incorporeal Substances are Nature.* This is the very Connection, said he, of the whole Deduction, in the foregoing Words; which I understand not, if I understand the Words: And if I understand not the Words, I am yet farther from understanding any thing of this Explication of *Nature*, whereby we are to come to *clear and distinct Apprehensions of it.*

Methinks, said he, going on, I understand how by making *Nature* and *Substance* one and the same thing, that may serve to bring *Substance* into this Dispute; but for all that, I cannot, for my Life, understand *Nature* to be *Substance*, nor *Substance* to be *Nature*.

There is another Inference, said he, in the close of this Paragraph,
which

Vindicat.
P. 253.

which both for its Connection and Expression seems, to me, very hard to be understood, it being set down in these Words. *So that the Nature of Things properly belongs to our Reason, and not to meer Ideas.* For when a Man knows what it is for the *Nature of Things properly to belong Reason, and not to meer Ideas*, there will, I guess, some Difficulty remain, in what Sense soever he shall understand that Expression, to deduce this Proposition as an Inference from the foregoing Words, which are these. *I grant, That by Sensation and Reflection, we come to know the Powers and Properties of Things; but our Reason is satisfied that there must be something beyond those, because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves: So that the Nature of Things properly belongs to our Reason, and not to meer Ideas.*

Answ.
P. 101.

'Tis true, said I; but his Lordship, upon my taking *Reason* in that place for the Power of Reasoning, hath, in his Answer, with a little kind of Warmth, corrected my Mistake, in these Words. *Still you are at it, That* "you can find no opposition between
"Ideas and Reason; But Ideas are
"Ob-

“ Objects of the Understanding, and the
 “ Understanding is one of the Facul-
 “ ties imploy’d about them. No doubt
 of it. But you might easily see that by
Reason, I understood Principles of Rea-
son, allow’d by Mankind; which, I think,
are very different from Ideas. But I
perceive Reason, in this Sense, is a Thing
you have no Idea of; or one as obscure as
that of Substance.

I imagin, said the Gentleman, That
 if his Lordship should be asked, How
 he perceives you have *no Idea of Rea-*
son in that Sense, or one as obscure as that
of Substance; he would scarce have a
 Reason ready to give for his saying so:
 And what we say which Reason can-
 not account for, must be ascribed to
 some other Cause.

Now truly, said I, my Mistake was
 so innocent and so unaffected, that if I
 had had these very Words said to me
 then, which his Lordship rounds in
 my Ears now, to awaken my Under-
 standing, viz. *That the Principles of*
Reason are very different from Ideas; I
 do not yet find how they would have
 help’d me to see what, it seems, was
 no small Fault, that I did not see be-
 fore. Because, let *Reason*, taken for
 Prin-

Principles of Reason, be as different as it will from *Ideas*; Reason, taken as a Faculty, is as different from them, in my Apprehension: And in both Senses of the Word *Reason*, either as taken for a Faculty, or for the *Principles of Reason allowed by Mankind*, Reason and Ideas may consist together.

Certainly, said the Gentleman, *Ideas* have something in them that you do not see; or else such a small Mistake as you made, in endeavouring to make them consistent with *Reason*, as a Faculty, would not have moved so great a Man as my Lord Bishop of W. so, as to make him tell you, *That Reason*, taken for the *common Principles of Reason*, is a Thing whereof you have no Idea, or one as obscure as that of Substance. For, if I mistake not, you have in your Book, in more Places than one, spoke, and that pretty largely, of Self-evident Propositions and Maxims: So that, if his Lordship has ever read those parts of your *Essay*, he cannot doubt, but that you have *Ideas* of those *common Principles of Reason*.

It may be so, I reply'd; but such Things are to be born from great Men, who

who often use them as Marks of Distinction: Though I should less expect them from my Lord Bishop of *W.* than from almost any one; because he has the solid and interior Greatness of Learning, as well as that of outward Title and Dignity. But since he expects it from me, I will do what I can to see what, he says, is his Meaning here by *Reason*. I will repeat it just as his Lordship says, *I might easily have seen what he understood by it.* My Lord's Words, immediately following those above taken Notice of, are.

And so that which is the Subject of Powers Vindicat.
and Properties is the Nature, whether it p. 252.
be meant of Bodily or Spiritual Sub-
stances. And then follow these, which to be rightly understood, his Lordship says must be read thus: *I grant, That by Sensation and Reflection, we come to know the Properties of Things; but our Reason, i. e. the Principles of Reason allowed by Mankind, are satisfied, that there must be something beyond these, because it is impossible they should subsist by themselves: So that the Nature of Things properly belongs to our Reason, i. e. to the Principles of Reason allowed by Mankind, and not to meer Ideas.*

This

This Explication of it, reply'd the Gentleman, which my Lord Bishop has given of this Passage, makes it more unintelligible to me, than it was before; and I know him to be so great a Master of Sense, that I doubt whether he himself will be better satisfied with this Sense of his Words, than with that which you understood it in. But let us go on to the two next Paragraphs, wherein his Lordship is at farther Pains to give us *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*: And that we may not mistake, let us first read his Words; which run thus.

Vindic.
P. 253.

But we must yet proceed farther: For Nature may be consider'd two ways.

1. *As it is in distinct Individuals; as the Nature of a Man is equally in Peter, James and John; and this is the common Nature, with a particular Subsistence, proper to each of them. For the Nature of a Man, as in Peter, is distinct from that same Nature, as it is in James and John; otherwise they would but be one Person, as well as have the same Nature. And this distinction of Persons in them, is discerned both by our Senses, as to their different Accidents; and by our Reason, because they have a*
sepa-

separate Existence; not coming into it at once, and in the same manner.

2. Nature may be considered abstractly, without respect to individual Persons; and then it makes an entire Notion of it self. For, however the same Nature may be in different Individuals, yet the Nature in it self remains one and the same; which appears from this evident Reason, That otherwise every Individual must make a different kind.

In these Words, said he, having read them, I find the same Difficulties you took notice of in your Letter. As first, That it is not declared whether his Lordship speaks here of Nature, as standing for *Essential Properties*, or of Nature, as standing for *Substance*; which dubiousness, casts an Obscurity on the whole place. And next, I can no more tell than you, whether it be his Lordships Opinion that I ought to think, That *one and the same Nature* is in *Peter* and *John*; or, That a Nature distinct from that in *John*, is in *Peter*; and that for the same Reason, which left you at a loss, viz. Because I cannot put together *one and the same*, and *distinct*. But since his Lordship, in his Answer to you, has said nothing

to give us Light in these Matters, we must be content to be in the Dark; and if he has not thought fit to explain it, so as to make himself to be understood by us, we may be sure he has a Reason for it. But pray tell me, Did you understand the rest of these two Paragraphs that you mentioned, only those two Difficulties? For I must profess to you, That I understand so little of either of them, that they contribute nothing at all to give me those *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person*, which I find, by his Lordship, it is necessary to have, before one can have a right Understanding of the Doctrine of the Trinity. Nay, I am so far from gaining by his Lordships Discourse, those *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person*, that what he objects to your *new Method of Certainty*, I found verified, in this his *clearing the Distinction between Nature and Person*, that it left me in *more Doubt than* I was in before.

Truly Sir, reply'd I, that was just my Case; but minding then only what I thought immediately related to the Objections to my Book, which
fol-

followed ; I passed by what I might have retorted concerning the Obscurity and Difficulty, in his Lordships Doctrin about *Nature* and *Person*, and contented my self to tell his Lordship, in as respectful Terms as I could find, that I could not understand him ; which drew from him that severe Reflection, That I obstinately stick to a way that leads to *Scepticism*, which is the *way of Ideas*. But now that, for the Vindication of my Book, I am shewing that his Lordships way, *without Ideas*, does as little (I will not say less) furnish us with *clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person*, as my *Essay* does ; I do not see but that his Lordships *Vindication of the Trinity*, is as much against the Doctrin of the Trinity, as my *Essay of Humane Understanding* ; and may, with as much Reason on that account, be animadverted on by another, who vindicates *the Doctrin of the Trinity*, as my Book is by his Lordship.

Indeed, said he, if failing of *clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person*, render any Book obnoxious to one that vindicates *the Doctrin of the Trinity*, and gives him

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sufficient Cause to write against it, as opposite to that *Doctrin*; I know no Book of more *dangerous Consequence* to that Article of Faith, nor more necessary to be writ against by a Defender of that Article, than that part of his Lordships *Vindication*, which we are now upon. For to my Thinking, I never met with any Thing more unintelligible about that Subject, nor that is more remote from *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person*. For what more effectual Method could there be to confound the Notions of *Nature and Person*, instead of clearing their *Distinction*, than to discourse of them without first defining them? Is this a way, to give *clear and distinct Apprehensions* of two Words, upon a *right understanding of which, all our Notions of the Doctrin of the Trinity depend?* And without which, we must talk unintelligibly about that *Point*.

vindic.
P. 253.

His Lordship tells us here, *Nature may be considered two ways*. What is it the near to be told, *Nature may be considered two or twenty ways*, till we know what that is which is to be consider'd two ways? *i. e.* till he defines
the

the Term *Nature*, that we may know what precisely is the Thing meant by it.

He tells us, *Nature may be consider'd,*

1. *As it is in Individuals.*

2. *Abstractly.*

1. His Lordship says, *Nature may be consider'd, as in distinct Individuals.*

'Tis true, by those that know what *Nature* is. But his Lordship having not yet told me what *Nature* is, nor what he here means by it, it is impossible for me to *consider Nature* in or out of *Individuals*, unless I can consider I know not what: So that this Consideration is, to me, as good as no Consideration; neither does or can it help at all to any *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*. Indeed, he says, *Aristotle*, by *Nature*, signified a *Corporeal Substance*; and from thence his Lordship takes occasion to say, That *Nature and Substance are of an equal Extent*: Though *Aristotle*, taking *Nature* for a *Corporeal Substance*, gave no Ground for such a saying, because *Corporeal Substance and Substance are not of an equal Extent*. But to pass by that: If his Lordship would have us understand here, that by *Nature* he

means *Substance*, this is but substituting one Name in the place of another; and, which is worse, a more doubtful and obscure Term, in the place of one that is less so; which will, I fear, not give us very *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*. His Lordship goes on.

As the Nature of a Man is equally in Peter, James and John; and this is the common Nature, with a particular Subsistence proper to each of them.

Here his Lordship does not tell us what consideration of *Nature* there may be, but actually affirms and teaches something. I wish I had the Capacity to learn by it, *the clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person*, which is the Lesson he is upon here. He says, *That the Nature of a Man is equally in Peter, James and John.* That's more than I know: Because I do not know what Things *Peter, James and John*, are. They may be Drills, or Horses, for ought I know; as well as *Weweena, Cuchipe and Cousbeda*, may be Drills, as his Lordship says, *for ought he knows.* For I know no Law of Speech that more necessarily makes these three Sounds,

Sounds, *Peter*, *James* and *John*, stand for three Men; than *Weweena*, *Cuchi*pe and *Cousbeda*, stand for three Men: For I knew a Horse that was called *Peter*; and I do not know but the Master of the same Team might call other of his Horses, *James* and *John*. Indeed if *Peter*, *James* and *John*, are supposed to be the Names only of Men, it cannot be questioned but the *Nature of Man is equally in them*; unless one can suppose each of them to be a Man, without having the Nature of a Man in him: That is, suppose him to be a Man, without being a Man. But then this to me, I confess, gives no manner of *clear or distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature* in general, or the *Nature of Man* in particular; it seeming, to me, to say no more but this, That a Man is a Man, and a Drill is a Drill, and a Horse is a Horse. Or, which is all one, what has the Nature of a Man, has the Nature of a Man, or is a Man; and what has the Nature of a Drill, has the Nature of a Drill, or is a Drill; and what has the Nature of a Horse, has the Nature of a Horse, or is a Horse; whether it be called *Peter*, or not called

led *Peter*. But if any one should repeat this a thousand times to me, and go over all the Species of Creatures, with such an unquestionable Assertion of every one of them ; I do not find, that thereby I should get one Jot clearer or distincter Apprehensions either of *Nature*, in general ; or of the *Nature* of a Man, a Horse, or a Drill, &c. in particular.

His Lordship adds, *And this is the common Nature, with a particular Subsistence, proper to each of them.* I do not doubt but his Lordship set down these Words with a very good Meaning ; but such is my Misfortune that I, for my Life, cannot find it out. I have repeated *And this*, twenty times to my self ; and my weak Understanding always revolts, And what ? To which I am always ready to answer, *The Nature of a Man in Peter, and the Nature of Man in James, and the Nature of a Man in John, is the common Nature ;* and there I stop, and can go no farther to make it coherent to my self, till I add *of Man ;* and then it must be read thus, *The Nature of Man in Peter, is the common Nature of Man, with a particular Subsistence proper to Peter.*

Peter. That the *Nature of Man* in *Peter*, is the *Nature of a Man*, if *Peter* be supposed to be a Man, I certainly know, let the Nature of Man be what it will, of which I yet know nothing: But if *Peter* be not supposed to be the Name of a Man, but be the Name of an Horse, all that Knowledge vanishes, and I know nothing. But let *Peter* be never so much a Man, and let it be impossible to give that Name to a Horse, yet I cannot understand these Words, That the *common Nature* of Man is in *Peter*; for whatsoever is in *Peter*, exists in *Peter*; and whatever exists in *Peter*, is particular: But the *common Nature* of Man, is the general Nature of Man, or else I understand not what is meant by *common Nature*. And it confounds my Understanding, to make a General a Particular.

But to help me to conceive this Matter, I am told; *It is the common Nature, with a particular Subsistence proper to Peter*. But this helps not my Understanding in the Case. For first, I do not understand what *Subsistence* is, if it signifie any Thing different from *Existence*: And if it be the same with *Existence*, then it is so far from loosening

the Knot, that it leaves it just as it was, only covered with the obscure and less known Term *Subsistence*. For the Difficulty to me, is, to conceive an Universal Nature, or Universal any Thing, to exist; which would be, in my Mind, to make an Universal a Particular: Which, to me, is impossible.

No, said another who was by, 'Tis but using the Word *Subsistence* instead of *Existence*, and there is nothing easier; if one will consider this *common* or universal *Nature*, with a particular *Existence*, under the Name of *Subsistence*, the Business is done.

Just as easie, reply'd the former, I find it in my self, as to consider the Nature of a Circle with four Angles; for to consider a Circle with four Angles is no more impossible to me, than to consider a Universal with a particular *Existence*; which is to consider a Universal really existing, and in effect a Particular. But the Words *Proper to each of them*, follow to help me out. I hoped so, till I considered them; and then I found I understood them as little as all the rest. For I know not what is a *Subsistence proper to Peter*, more than

than to *James* or *John*, till I know *Peter* himself; and then indeed my Senses will discern him from *James* or *John*, or any Man living.

His Lordship goes on; *For the Nature of Man, as in Peter, is distinct from that same Nature as it is in James and John; otherwise they would be but one Person, as well as have the same Nature.* These Words, by the causal Particle *For*, which introduces them, should be a Proof of something that goes before: But what they are meant for a Proof of, I confess I understand not. For the Proposition preceding, as far as I can make any Thing of it, is this, That the general Nature of a Man has a particular Existence in each of the three, *Peter, James and John*. But then how the saying, *That the Nature of Man, as in Peter, is distinct from the same Nature as it is in James and John*, does prove that the general Nature of Man does, or can exist in either of them, I cannot see.

The Words which follow, *Otherwise they would be one Person, as well as have the same Nature*, I see the Connection of; for it is visible they were brought to prove, That the Nature
in

in *Peter*, is *distinct* from the *Nature* in *James* and *John*. But with all that, I do not see of what Use or Significancy they are here : Because, to me, they are more obscure and doubtful, than the Proposition they are brought to prove. For I scarce think there can be a clearer Proposition than this, *viz.* That three Natures, that have three distinct Existences in three Men, are, as his Lordship says, three distinct Natures, and so needs no Proof. But to prove it by this, That *otherwise they could not be three Persons*, is to prove it by a Proposition unintelligible to me ; because his Lordship has not yet told me, what the *clear and distinct Apprehension of Person is*, which I ought to have. For his Lordships supposing it, as he does, to be a Term, which has in it self a certain Signification ; I, who have no such Conception of it, should in vain look for it in the Propriety of our Language, which is established upon arbitrary Imposition ; and so can, by no means, imagin what *Person* here signifies, till his Lordship shall do me the Favour to tell me.

To this I reply'd, That Page 259, which is but six Pages farther, your
Lord-

Lordship explains the Notion of *Person*.

To which the Gentleman answer'd, Whether I can get clear and distinct Apprehensions of *Person*, by what his Lordship says there of *Person*, I shall see when I come to it. But this, in the mean time, must be confessed, That *Person* comes in here six Pages too soon, for those who want his Lordships Explication of it, to make them have *clear and distinct Apprehensions* of what he means, when he uses it.

For we must certainly talk *unintelligibly* about *Nature* and *Person*, as well as about the *Doctrin of the Trinity*, unless we have *clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person*; as his Lordship says, in the foregoing Page.

It follows, *And this Distinction of Persons in them, is discerned both by our Senses, as to their different Accidents; and by our Reason, because they have a separate Existence; not coming into it at once and in the same manner.*

These Words, said he, which conclude this Paragraph, tells us how *Persons* are distinguished: But as far as I can see, serve not at all to give us any
clear

clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature, by considering it in distinct Individuals; which was the Business of this Paragraph.

His Lordship says, *We may consider Nature as in distinct Individuals: And so I do as much, when I consider it in three distinct Physical Atoms or Particles, of Air or Æther, as when I consider it in Peter, James and John. For three distinct Physical Atoms are three distinct Individuals, and have three distinct Natures in them, as certainly as three distinct Men; though I cannot discern the Distinction between them by my Senses, as to their different Accidents; nor is their separate Existence discernable to my Reason, by their not coming into it at once and in the same manner: For they did, for ought I know, or at least might, come into Existence at once and in the same manner, which was by Creation. I think it will be allowed, That God did, or might, create more than one Physical Atom of Matter at once: So that here Nature may be considered in distinct Individuals, without any of those ways of Distinction which his Lordship here speaks of: And so I cannot see how*

how these last Words contribute ought to give us *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*, by considering *Nature in distinct Individuals*.

But to try what *clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature*, his Lordships way of considering *Nature* in this Paragraph carries in it ; let me repeat his Lordships Discourse to you here, only changing one *common Nature* for another, *viz.* putting the *common Nature of Animal*, for the *common Nature of Man*, which his Lordship has chose to instance in ; and then his Lordships Words would run thus. *Nature may be considered two ways. First, As it is in distinct Individuals ; as the Nature of an Animal is equally in Alexander, Bucephalus, and Podargus : And this is the common Nature, with a particular Subsistence, proper to each of them. For the Nature of Animal, as in Bucephalus, is distinct from the same Nature as in Podargus and Alexander ; otherwise they would be but one Person, as well as have the same Nature. And this distinction of Persons in them, is discerned both by our Senses, as to their different Accidents ; and by our Reason, because they have a separate Existence, not coming*

coming into it at once and in the same manner.

To this I said, I thought he did Violence to your Lordships Sense, in applying the Word *Person*, which signifies an intelligent Individual, to *Bucephalus* and *Podargus*, which were two irrational Animals.

To which the Gentleman reply'd, That he fell into this Mistake, by his thinking your Lordship had somewhere spoken, as if an individual intelligent *Substance*, were not the proper Definition of *Person*. But, continued he, I lay no Stress on the Word *Person*, in the Instance wherein I have used his Lordships Words, and therefore, if you please, put *Individual* for it; and then reading it so, let me ask you, Whether that way of considering it, contributes any thing to the giving you *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*? Which it ought to do, if his Lordships way of *considering Nature*, in that Paragraph, were of any use to that purpose: Since the *common Nature* of Animal is as much the same; or, as his Lordship says in the next Paragraph, *as much an entire Notion of it self*, as the *common Nature of Man*.
And

And the *common Nature* of Animal, is as equally in *Alexander, Bucephalus* and *Podargus*, with a *particular Subsistence* proper to each of them; as the *common Nature* of Man is equally in *Peter, James* and *John*, with a *particular Subsistence* proper to each of them, &c. But pray what does all this do, towards the giving you *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*?

I replied, Truly neither the consideration of Nature, as in his Lordships distinct Individuals, *viz.* in *Peter, James* and *John*; nor the consideration of Nature, as in your distinct Individuals, *viz.* in *Alexander, Bucephalus* and *Podargus*, did any Thing towards the giving me *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*. Nay, they were so far from it, that, after having gone over both the one and the other several times in my Thoughts, I seem to have less *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*, than I had before. But whether it will be so with other People, as I perceive it is with you and me, and some others, none of the dullest, whom I have talked with upon this Subject, that must be left to Experience; and if there be others that
do

do hereby get such *clear and distinct* *Apprehensions concerning Nature*, which may help them in their *Notions* of the Trinity, that cannot be denied them.

That's true, said he: But if that be so, I must necessarily conclude, That the *Notionists* and the *Ideists*, have their apprehensive Faculties very differently turned; since in their explaining themselves (which they on both sides think clear and intelligible) they cannot understand one another.

But let us go on to *Nature*, consider'd *abstractly*, in the next Words.

2. *Nature may be consider'd*, says his Lordship, *abstractly*, without respect to *individual Persons*.

I do not see, said he, what *Persons* do here, more than any other Individuals. For *Nature*, considered *abstractly*, has no more respect to *Persons*, than any other sort of Individuals.

And then, says his Lordship, *it makes an entire Notion of it self*. To make an *entire Notion of it self*, being an Expression I never met with before, I shall not, I think, be much blamed if I be not confident, that I

per-

perfectly understand it. To guess therefore, as well as I can, what can be meant by it, I consider, That whatever the Mind makes an Object of its Contemplation at any time, may be called one *Notion*, or, as you perhaps would call it, one *Idea*; which may be an *entire Notion* or *Idea*, though it be but the half of what is the Object of the Mind at another time. For methinks the Number Five is as much an *entire Notion of it self*, when the Mind contemplates the Number Five by it self; as the Number Ten is an *entire Notion by it self*, when the Mind contemplates that alone and its Properties: And in this Sense I can understand an *entire Notion by it self*. But if it mean any Thing else, I confess I do not understand it. But then the Difficulty remains, for I cannot see how in this Sense, *Nature abstractly considered makes an entire Notion*, more than the Nature of *Peter makes an entire Notion*. For if the Nature in *Peter* be considered by it self, or if the abstract *Nature of Man* be consider'd by it self, or if the *Nature of Animal* (which is yet more abstract) be consider'd by it self, every one of these

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being made the whole Object, that the Mind at any time contemplates, seems, to me, as *much an entire Notion*, as either of the other.

But farther, What the calling *Nature*, abstractly consider'd, an entire Notion in it self, contributes to our having or not having clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature, is yet more remote from my Comprehension.

Vindicat.
P. 254.

His Lordships next Words are ; *For however the same Nature may be in different Individuals, yet the Nature in it self remains one and the same : Which appears from this evident Reason, That otherwise every Individual must make a different kind.*

The Coherence of which Discourse, continued he, tending, as it seems, to prove, That *Nature considered abstractly makes an entire Notion of it self* ; stands, as far as I can comprehend it, thus. *Because every Individual must not make a different Kind ; therefore Nature, however it be in different Individuals, yet in it self it remains one and the same. And because Nature, however it be in different Individuals, yet in it self remains one and the same ; therefore, consider'd abstractly, it makes an entire Notion of*
it

it self. This is the Argument of this Paragraph ; and the Connection of it, if I understand the connecting Words, *For, and from this evident Reason.* But if they are used for any Thing else but to tie those Propositions together, as the Proofs one of another, in that way I have mentioned them ; I confess, I understand them not, nor any Thing that is meant by this whole Paragraph. And in that Sense I understand it in, what it does towards the giving us *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*, I must confess I do not see at all.

Thus far, said he, we have consider'd his Lordships Explication of *Nature* ; and my understanding what his Lordship has discoursed upon it, under several Heads, for *the giving us clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning it.*

Let us now read what his Lordship has said concerning *Person* ; that I may, since you desire it of me, let you see how far I have got any *clear and distinct Apprehension of Person*, from his Lordships Explications of that. His Lordships Words are ; *Let us*

Vindicat.
P. 259.

now come to the Idea of a Person. For although the common Nature of Mankind be the same, yet we see a difference in the several Individuals from one another: So that Peter, and James, and John, are all of the same kind; yet Peter is not James, and James is not John. But what is this Distinction founded upon? They may be distinguished from each other by our Senses, as to difference of Features, distance of Place, &c. but that is not all; for supposing there were no external difference, yet there is a difference between them, as several Individuals in the same common Nature. And here lies the true Idea of a Person, which arises from the manner of Subsistence which is in one Individual, and is not communicable to another. An individual intelligent Substance, is rather supposed to the making of a Person, than the proper definition of it; for a Person relates to something which doth distinguish it from another Intelligent Substance in the same Nature; and therefore the Foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of Subsistence, which agrees to one, and to none else, of the kind; and this is it which is called Personality.

In

In these Words, this I understand very well, That supposing *Peter*, *James* and *John*, to be all three Men; and Man being a Name for one *kind* of Animals, *they are all of the same kind*. I understand too very well, That *Peter is not James, and James is not John, but that there is a difference in these several Individuals*. I understand also, That they may be distinguished from each other by our Senses, as to different Features and distance of Place, &c. But what follows, I do confess I do not understand, where his Lordship says, *But that is not all; for supposing there were no such external difference, yet there is a difference between them, as several Individuals in the same Nature*. For First, Whatever Willingness I have to gratifie his Lordship in whatever he would have me, suppose, yet I cannot, I find, suppose, That there is no such *external difference* between *Peter* and *James*, as difference of Place; for I cannot suppose a Contradiction: And it seems to me to imply a Contradiction to say, *Peter* and *James* are not in different Places. The next Thing I do not understand, is,

what his Lordship says in these Words, *For supposing there were no such external difference, yet there is a difference between them, as several Individuals in the same Nature.* For these Words being here to shew, what the *distinction* of Peter, James and John, is *founded upon*, I do not understand how they at all do it.

His Lordship says, *Peter is not James, and James is not John.* He then asks, *But what is this Distinction founded upon?* And to resolve that he answers, *Not by difference of Features, or distance of Place, with an &c.* Because, *Supposing there were no such external difference, yet there is a difference between them.* In which Passage, by these Words, *Such external difference*, must be meant all other difference but what his Lordship, in the next Words, is going to name; or else I do not see how his Lordship shews, *what this Distinction is founded upon.* For if, *Supposing such external differences away*, there may be other differences on which to found their *Distinction*, besides that other which his Lordship subjoins, *viz. The difference that is between*

between them, as several Individuals in the same Nature. I cannot see that his Lordship has said any thing to shew, what the Distinction between those Individuals is founded on; because if he has not, under the Terms *external difference*, comprized all the differences besides that his chief and fundamental one, viz. *The difference between them as several Individuals, in the same common Nature*; it may be founded on what his Lordship has not mentioned. I conclude then it is his Lordships meaning, (or else I can see no meaning in his Words) That *supposing* no difference between them, of *Features or distance of Place, &c. i. e.* no other difference between them, yet there would be still the true Ground of Distinction, in the *difference between them, as several Individuals in the same common Nature*.

Let us then understand, if we can, what is the *Difference between Things*, barely as *several Individuals, in the same common Nature*, all other Differences laid aside.

Truly, said I, that I cannot conceive.

Nor I neither, reply'd the Gentleman: For considering them as several Individuals, was what his Lordship did, when he said, *Peter was not James, and James was not John*; and if that were enough to shew, *on what the distinction between them was founded*, his Lordship needed have gone no farther in his Enquiry after that, for that he had found already: And yet methinks thither are we at last come again, *as to the foundation of the distinction between them, viz. That they are several Individuals in the same common Nature*. Nor can I here see any other Ground of the *Distinction* between those, that are *several Individuals in the same common Nature*, but this, That they are *several Individuals in the same common Nature*. Either this is all the Meaning that his Lordships Words, when consider'd, carry in them; or else I do not understand what they mean: And either way, I must own, they do not much towards the giving me *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person*.

One Thing more I must remark to you, in his Lordships way of expressing himself here; and that is in the
former

former part of the Words last read, he speaks, as he does all along, of the *same common Nature being in Mankind*, or in the several Individuals: And in the latter part of them, he speaks of *several Individuals being in the same common Nature*. I do by no means find Fault with such figurative and common ways of Speaking, in popular and ordinary Discourses, where unaccurate Thoughts allow unaccurate ways of Speaking; but I think I may say, That Metaphorical Expressions, (which seldom terminate in precise Truth) should be as much as possible avoided, when Men undertake to deliver *clear and distinct Apprehensions*, and exact Notions of Things: Because, being taken strictly and according to the Letter, (as we find they are apt to be) they always puzzle and mislead, rather than enlighten and instruct.

I do not say this (continued he) with an Intention to accuse his Lordship of unaccurate Notions; but yet, I think, his sticking so close all along to that vulgar way of Speaking of the *same common Nature*, being in *several Individuals*, has made him less easy to be understood.

stood. For to speak truly and precisely of this Matter, as in reality it is, There is no such Thing as *one and the same common Nature in several Individuals*: For all, that in Truth is in them, is particular, and can be nothing but particular. But the true meaning (when it has any) of that metaphorical and popular Phrase, I take to be this, and no more, That every particular individual Man or Horse, &c. has such a Nature or Constitution, as agrees and is conformable to that Idea, which that general Name stands for.

His Lordships next Words are ; *And here lies the true Idea of a Person, which arises from that manner of Subistence which is in one Individual, and is not communicable to another.* The reading of these Words, said he, makes me wish, That we had some other way of communicating our Thoughts, than by Words ; for, no doubt, it would have been as much a Pleasure to have seen what his Lordships Thoughts were, when he writ this ; as it is now an Uneasiness to pudder in Words and Expressions, whose meaning one does not comprehend.

But

But let us do the best we can. *And here*, says his Lordship, *lies the true Idea of Person.*

Person being a Dis-syllable, that in it self signifies nothing; what is meant by the *true Idea* of it (it having no *Idea*, one more than another, that belongs to it, but the *Idea* of the articulate Sound, that those two Syllables make in pronouncing) I do not understand. If by *true Idea*, be meant true Signification, then these Words will run thus, *Here lies* the true Signification of the Word *Person*; and then to make it more intelligible, we must change *Here* into *Herein*, and then the whole Comma will stand thus; *Herein lies the true Signification of the Word Person*; which reading *Herein*, must refer to the preceding Words. And then the meaning of these Words will be, The true Signification of *Person* lies in this, that *supposing* there were no other difference in the several *Individuals of the same kind*, yet there is a difference between them, as several *Individuals in the same common Nature*. Now, if in this *lies* the true Signification of the Word *Person*, he must find

find it here that can. For if he does find it in these Words, he must find it to be such a Signification, as will make the Word *Person* agree as well to *Bucephalus* and *Podargus*, as to *Alexander*: For let the difference between *Bucephalus* and *Podargus*, as several *Individuals* in the same common Nature, be what it will; 'tis certain, 'twill always be as great, as the difference between *Alexander* and *Hector*, as several *Individuals* in the same common Nature. So that, if the true Signification of *Person* lies in that difference, it will belong to *Bucephalus* and *Podargus*, as well as to *Alexander* and *Hector*. But let any one reason never so subtilly or profoundly about the true *Idea*, or true Signification of the Term *Person*, he will never be able to make me understand, That *Bucephalus* and *Podargus* are *Persons*, in the true Signification of the Word *Person*, as commonly used in the English Tongue.

But that which more certainly and for ever will hinder me from finding the true Signification of *Person*, lying in the foregoing Words, is, That they require me to do, what I find is impossible

possible for me to do, *i. e.* Find a difference between two Individuals, *as several Individuals in the same common Nature*, without any other difference. For if I never found any other difference, I should never find two Individuals. For First, We find some difference, and by that we find they are two or several Individuals; but in this way we are bid to find two Individuals, without any difference: But that, I find, is too subtil and sublime for my weak Capacity. But when by any difference of Time, or Place, or any Thing else, I have once found them to be two, or *several*, I cannot for ever after consider them but as several. They being once, by some difference, found to be two, 'tis unavoidable for me, from thenceforth, to consider them as two. But to find *severals* where I find no *difference*; or, as his Lordship is pleased to call it, *external difference* at all, is, I confess, too hard for me.

This his Lordship farther tells us, in these Words which follow; *Which arises from the manner of Subsistence which is in one Individual, which is not*
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communicable to another: Which is, I own, a learned way of Speaking, and is supposed to contain some refined Philosophick Notion in it, which to me is either wholly incomprehensible, or else may be expressed in these plain and common Words, *viz.* That every Thing that exists, has, in the Time or Place, or other perceivable differences of its Existence, something incommunicable to all those of its own kind, whereby it will eternally be kept *several* from all the rest. This, I think, is that which the Learned have been pleased to term a *peculiar manner of Subsistence*; but if this *manner of Subsistence* be any Thing else, it will need some farther Explication to make me understand it.

His Lordships next Words which follow, I must acknowledge are also wholly incomprehensible to me: They are, *An individual intelligent Substance, is rather supposed to the making of a Person, than the proper Definition of it.*

Person is a Word; and the Idea that Word stands for, or the proper Signification of that Word, is what I
take

take his Lordship is here giving us. Now what is meant by saying, *An individual intelligent Substance, is rather supposed to the making the Signification of the Word Person, than the proper Definition of it, is beyond my Reach.* And the Reason his Lordship adjoins, puts it in that, or any other Sense, farther from my Comprehension. *For a Person relates to something, which does distinguish it from another intelligent Substance in the same Nature; and therefore the Foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of Subsistence, which agrees to one, and none else, of the kind; and this is that which is called Personality.*

These Words, if nothing else, convince me, That I am *Davus*, and not *Oedipus*; and so I must leave them.

His Lordship, at last, gives us what, I think, he intends for a Definition of *Person*, in these Words, *Therefore a* Vindicat. P. 261. *Person is a compleat intelligent Substance, with a peculiar manner of Subsistence.* Where I cannot but observe, That what was, as I think, denied or half denied to be the proper Definition of *Person*, in saying, *It was rather supposed to the making of a Person, than the proper*

proper Definition of it, is yet here got into his Lordships Definition of *Person*; which I cannot suppose, but his Lordship takes to be a *proper Definition*. There is only one Word changed in it; and instead of *individual intelligent Substance*, his Lordship has put it *compleat intelligent Substance*; which, whether it makes his the more *proper Definition*, I leave to others; since possibly some will be apt to think, That a *proper Definition of Person* cannot be well made, without the Term *individual*, or an equivalent. But his Lordship has, as appears by the Place, put in *compleat*, to exclude the *Soul* from being a *Person*; which, whether it does it or no, to me seems doubtful: Because possibly many may think, That the *Soul* is a *compleat intelligent Substance* by it self, whether in the *Body* or out of the *Body*; because every *Substance* that has a *Being* is a *compleat Substance*, whether joined or not joined to another. And as to the *Souls* being intelligent, no *Body*, I guess, thinks, That the *Soul* is compleated in that, by its Union with the *Body*; for then it would follow, That it would not be equally intelligent out of the *Body*; which,

Vindicat.
P. 216.

which, I think, no Body will say.

And thus I have, at your Request, gone over all that his Lordship has said, to give us *Clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person*, which are so necessary to the understanding the Doctrin of the Trinity, and talking intelligibly about it. And if I should judge of others by my own Dulness, I should fear that by his Lordships Discourse, few would be helped to think or talk intelligibly about it. But I measure not others by my narrow Capacity: I wish others may profit by his Lordships Explication of *Nature and Person*, more than I have done. And so the Conversation ended.

My Lord, I should not have troubled your Lordship with a Dialogue of this kind, had not your Lordship forced me to it in my own Defence. Your Lordship, at the end of your vindic.
above-mentioned Explication of *Na-* P. 254.
ture, has these Words, *Let us now see how far these Things can come from our Ideas, by Sensation and Reflection.* And to the like purpose, in the close of your
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Explication of *Person*, your Lordship says, *But how do our simple Ideas help us out in this Matter? Can we learn from them the difference of Notion and Person?* Your Lordship concludes we cannot. But you say, What makes a *Person*, *must be understood some other way.* And hereupon, my Lord, my Book is thought worthy by your Lordship, to be brought into the Controversie and argued against, in your *Vindication of the Doctrin of the Trinity*; because, as your Lordship conceives, *Clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person*, cannot be had from it.

I humbly crave Leave to represent to your Lordship, That if want of affording *clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person*, make any Book Anti-trinitarian, and, as such, fit to be writ against by your Lordship; your Lordship ought, in the Opinion of a great many Men, in the first place, to write against your own *Vindication of the Doctrin of the Trinity*; since, among the many I have consulted concerning your Lordships Notions of *Nature and Person*, I do
not

not find any one that understands them better, or has got from them any *clearer or more distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person*, than I my self; which indeed is none at all.

The owning of this to your Lordship in my former Letter, I find displeased your Lordship: I have therefore here laid before your Lordship, some part of those Difficulties which appear to me, and others, in your Lordships Explication of *Nature and Person*, as my Apology for saying, I had not learned any Thing by it. And to make it evident, That if want of *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person*, involve any Treatise in the *Unitarian-Controversie*; your Lordships, upon that account, is, I humbly conceive, as guilty as mine; and may be reckon'd one of the first that ought to be charged with that Offence, against the *Doctrin of the Trinity*.

This, my Lord, I cannot help thinking, till I understand better. Whether the not being able to get *Clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person*, from what your Lord-

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ship

ship has said of them, be the want of Capacity in my Understanding, or want of Clearness in that which I have endeavoured to understand, I shall not presume to say; of that the World must judge. If it be my Dulness (as I cannot presume much upon my own Quickness, having every Day Experience how short-sighted I am) I have this yet to defend me, from any very severe Censure in the Case, That I have as much endeavoured to understand your Lordship, as I ever did to understand any Body. And if your Lordships Notions, laid down about *Nature* and *Person*, are plain and intelligible, there are a great many others, whose Parts lie under no Blemish in the World, who find them neither *plain nor intelligible*.

Pardon me therefore, I beseech you my Lord, if I return your Lordships Question, *How do your Lordships Notions help us out in this Matter? Can we learn from them, clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person, and the Grounds of Identity and Distinction?* To which the Answer will stand, No; till your Lordship has explained

plained your Notions of them a little clearer, and shewn what ultimately they are founded on and made up of, if they are not ultimately founded on and made up of our simple Ideas, received from Sensation and Reflection; which is that for which, in this Point, you except against my Book: And Vindic. P. 254, &c. yet, though your Lordship sets your self to prove, That they cannot be had from *our simple Ideas by Sensation and Reflection*; though your Lordship lays down several Heads about them, yet you do not, that I see, offer any Thing to instruct us from what other Original they come, or whence they are to be had.

But perhaps this may be my want of understanding what your Lordship has said about them: And, possibly, from the same Cause it is, that I do not see how the four Passages your Lordship subjoins, as out of my Book, Vindicat. P. 254, P. 255, P. 255, to 252. (though there be no such Passages in my Book; as, I think, your Lordship acknowledges, since your Lordship answers nothing to what I said thereupon;) The two Things your Lordship says are granted, P. 255; that tend to the

P. 255,
to 259.

clearing this Matter ; And the four Inferences your Lordship makes, are all, or any of them, applied by your Lordship, to shew, That *clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person* cannot be had upon my Principles ; At least as clear as can be had upon your Lordships, when you please to let us know them.

Hitherto, my Lord, I have consider'd only what is charged upon my Book by your Lordship, in reference to the *Unitarian-Controversie*, viz. The Manner and Grounds on which my Book has been, by your Lordship, endeavour'd to be brought into the Controversie concerning the Trinity, with which it hath nothing to do: Nor has your Lordship, as I humbly conceive, yet shew'd that it has.

There remains to be considered several Things, which your Lordship thinks faulty in my Book ; which, whether they have any Thing to do or no with the *Doctrin of the Trinity*, I think my self oblig'd to give your Lordship Satisfaction in, either by acknowledging my Errors, or giving your Lordship an account wherein
your

your Lordships Discourse comes short of convincing me of them. But these Papers being already grown to a Bulk, that exceeds the ordinary size of a Letter, I shall respite your Lordships farther Trouble in this Matter for the present, with this Promise, That I shall not fail to return my Acknowledgments to your Lordship, for those other parts of the Letter you have honoured me with.

Before I conclude, 'tis fit, with due Acknowledgment, I take notice of these Words, in the close of your Lordships Letter. *I hope, that in the P. 133. managing this Debate, I have not either transgressed the Rules of Civility, or mistaken your Meaning; both which I have endeavoured to avoid. And I return you Thanks for the Civilities you have expressed to me, through your Letter: And I do assure you, That it is out of no Disrespect, or the least Ill-will to you, that I have again consider'd this Matter, &c.*

Your Lordship hopes you have not mistaken my Meaning. And I, my Lord,

hope that where you have (as I humbly conceive I shall make it appear you have) *mistaken my Meaning*, I may, with out Offence, lay it before your Lordship. And I the more confidently ground that Hope upon this Expression of your Lordship here, which I take to be intended to that purpose; since, in those several Instances I gave in my former Letter, of your Lordships mistaking not only my Meaning, but the very Words of my Book, which you quoted, your Lordship has had the Goodness to bear with me, without any manner of Reply.

Answ.

P. 133.

Your Lordship assures me, *That it is out of no Disrespect or the least Ill-will to me, that you have again consider'd this Matter.*

My Lord, My never having, by any Act of mine, deserved otherwise of your Lordship, is a strong Reason to keep me from questioning what your Lordship says. And, I hope, my part in the Controversie has been such, that I may be excused from making any such Profession, in reference to what I write to your Lordship. And I shall take care to continue to defend
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my self so, in this Controversie, which your Lordship is pleased to have with me, that I shall not come within the need of any Apology, That what I say, *is out of no Disrespect or the least Ill-will to your Lordship.* But this must not hinder me any where, from laying the Argument in its due Light, for the Advantage of Truth.

This, my Lord, I say, not to your Lordship, who, proposing to your self, as you say in this very Page, nothing but *Truth*, will not, I know, take it amiss, That I endeavour to make every Thing as plain and as clear as I can: But this I say, upon occasion of some Exceptions of this kind, which I have heard others have made, against the former Letter I did my self the Honour to write to your Lordship, as if I did therein *bear too hard upon your Lordship.* Tho' your Lordship, who knows very well the End of Arguing, as well as Rules of Civility, finds nothing to blame in my way of Writing: And I should be very sorry it should deserve any
other

other Character, than what your Lordship has been pleased to give it in the beginning of your *Postscript*. It is my Misfortune to have any Controversie with your Lordship; but since the concern of Truth alone engages me in it, as I know your Lordship will expect that I should omit nothing that should make for Truth, for that is the End we both profess to aim at; so I shall take Care to avoid all foreign, passionate and unmannerly Mixtures, which do no way become a Lover of Truth in any Debate, especially with one of your Lordships Character and Dignity.

My Lord, The Imputation of a *Tendency to Scepticism*, and to the *overthrowing any Article of the Christian Faith*, are no small Charge; and all Censures of that high Nature, I humbly conceive, are with the more Caution to be passed, the greater the Authority is of the Person they come from. But whether to pronounce so hardly of the Book, meerly upon Surmises, be to be taken for a Mark of Good-will to the Author, I must leave to your Lordship. This I am
sure,

sure, I find the World thinks me obliged to vindicate my self. I have taken leave to say meerly upon Surmises, because I cannot see any Argument your Lordship has any where brought, to shew its Tendency to Sceptism, beyond what your Lordship has in these Words in this Page, *viz.* That it is your Lordships *great Prejudice against it that it leads to Sceptism*; or, *That your Lordship can find no way to attain to Certainty in it, upon my Grounds.*

I confess, my Lord, I think that there is a great part of the visible, and a great deal more of the yet much larger intellectual World, wherein our poor and weak Understandings, in this State, are not capable of Knowledge; and this, I think, a great part of Mankind agrees with me in. But whether or no my way of *Certainty by Ideas*, comes short of what it should; or your Lordships way, with or without Ideas, will carry us to clearer and larger degrees of Certainty, we shall see, when your Lordship pleases to let us know wherein your way of Certainty consists. Till then, I think, to avoid *Sceptism*, it is better
to

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to have some way of *Certainty* (though it will not lead us to it in every Thing) than no way at all.

P. 36. The necessity your Lordship has put upon me of vindicating my self, must be my Apology for giving your Lordship this second Trouble ; which, I assure my self, you will not take amiss, since your Lordship was so much concerned for my *Vindication*, as to declare, You *had no reason to be sorry*, that the Author of *Christianity not Myste-rious*, *had given me occasion* to vindicate my self. I return your Lordship my humble Thanks, for affording me this second Opportunity to do it ; and am, with the utmost Respect,

My LORD,

Your Lordships most humble

And most obedient Servant,

London, 29
Jun. 1697.

John Locke.

POST.

Postscript.

My Lord,


THough I have so great a Precedent, as your Lordship has given me in the Letter you have honoured me with; yet, I doubt, whether even your Lordships Example, will be enough to justify me to the World, if, in a Letter writ to one, I should put a Postscript in Answer to another Man, to whom I do not speak in my Letter: I shall therefore only beg, That your Lordship will be pleased to excuse it, if you find a short Answer to the Paper of another Man, not big enough to be published by it self, appear under the same Cover with my Answer to your Lordship. The Paper it self came to my Hands, at the same time that your Lordships Letter did; and containing

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taining some Exceptions to my *Essay*
concerning Humane Understanding, is
not wholly Foreign in the Matter
of it.

A N

AN
ANSWER
TO
REMARKS
UPON AN
ESSAY
Concerning
Humane Understanding.



A N
A N S W E R
T O
R E M A R K S
U P O N A N
E S S A Y

Concerning
Humane Understanding, &c.

BEFORE any Thing came out
against my *Essay concerning Hu-*
mane Understanding the last
Year, I was told, That I must pre-
pare my self for a Storm that was
coming against it; it being resolved
by some Men, That it was necessary
that Book of mine should, as 'tis
N phrased

phrased, be run down. I do not say, That the Author of these *Remarks* was one of those Men : But I premise this as the Reason of the Answer I am about to give him. And though I do not say he was one of them, yet in this, I think, every indifferent Reader will agree with me, That his Letter does not very well suit with the Character he takes upon himself, or the Design he pretends in writing it.

Pag 4.

He pretends, the Business of his Letter is *to be informed* : But if that were in earnest so, I suppose he would have done two Things quite otherwise than he has. The First is, That he would not have thought it necessary for his particular Information, that his Letter (that pretends Enquiry in the Body of it, though it carries *Remarks* in the Title) should have been published in Print : Whereby I am apt to think, That however in it he puts on the Person of a Learner, yet he would miss his Aim, if he were not taken notice of as a Teacher ; and particularly, that his *Remarks* shew'd the World great Faults in my Book.

The

The other is, That he has not set his Name to his Letter of Enquiries ; whereby I might , by knowing the Person that enquires, the better know how to suit my Answer to him. I cannot much blame him in another respect , for concealing his Name : For, I think, any one who appears among Christians, may be well ashamed of his Name, when he raises such a Doubt as this, *viz.* Whether P. 6. & 7. an infinitely powerful and wise Being, be *veracious* or no ; unless Falshood be in such Reputation with this Gentleman, that he concludes Lying to be no Mark of Weakness and Folly. Besides, this Author might, if he had pleased, have taken notice, That in more Places than one, I speak of the *Goodness* of God ; another Evidence, as I take it, of his *Veracity*.

He seems concerned to know upon *what Ground I will build the Divine* P. 6.
Law, when I pursue Morality to a Demonstration ?

If he had not been very much in haste, he would have seen, That his Questions, in that Paragraph, are a little too forward ; unless he thinks it necessary I should write, when and

upon what he thinks fit. When I know him better, I may perhaps think I owe him great Observance; but so much, as that very few Men think due to themselves.

I have said indeed in my Book, That I thought Morality capable of Demonstration, as well as Mathematicks: But I do not remember where I promised this Gentleman to demonstrate it to him.

He says, *If he knew upon what Grounds I would build my Demonstration of Morality, he could make a better Judgment of it.* His Judgment who makes such Demands as this, and is so much in haste to be a Judge, that he cannot stay till what he has such a Mind to be sitting upon, be born, does not seem of that Consequence, that any one should be in haste to gratifie his Impatience.

P. 4.

And since *he thinks the Illiterate part of Mankind (which is the greatest) must have a more compendious way to know their Duty, than by long Deductions.* He may do well to consider, whether it were for their Sakes he published this Question, *viz. What is the Reason and Ground of the Divine Law?*

P. 6.

Who-

Whoever sincerely acknowledges any Law to be the Law of God ; cannot fail to acknowledge also , That it hath all that *Reason and Ground* that a just and wise Law can or ought to have ; and will easily persuade himself to forbear raising such Questions and Scruples about it.

A Man that insinuates, as he does, P. 4. as if I held , That the *distinction of Vertue and Vice*, was to be picked up by *our Eyes, our Ears, or our Nostrils*; shews so much Ignorance, or so much Malice, that he deserves no other Answer but Pity.

The Immortality of the Soul is another P. 8. *Thing*, he says, *he cannot clear to himself, upon my Principles*. It may be so. The Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of *Worcester*, in the Letter he has lately honoured me with in Print, has undertaken to prove, upon my Principles, the Souls immateriality ; which I suppose, this Author will not question to be a Proof of its *Immortality*. And to his Lordships Letter, I refer P. 69. him for it. But if that will not serve his turn, I will tell him a *Principle* of mine that will *clear* it to him ; and that

that is, The Revelation of Life and *Immortality* by Jesus Christ, through the Gospel.

He mentions other Doubts he has, unresolved by my *Principles*. If my *Principles* do not reach them, the World I think will, I am sure I shall, be obliged to him, to direct me to such as will supply that Defect in mine. For I never had the Vanity to hope to out-do all other Men. Nor did I propose to my self, in publishing my *Essay*, to be an Answerer of Questions; Or expect that all Doubts should go out of the World, as soon as my Book came into it.

The World has now my Book, such as it is: If any one finds, That there be many Questions that my *Principles* will not resolve, he will do the World more Service to lay down such *Principles* as will resolve them, than to quarrel with my Ignorance, (which I readily acknowledge) and possibly for that which cannot be done. I shall never think the worse of mine, because they will not resolve every ones Doubts, till I see those *Principles*, laid down by any one, that will, and then I will quit mine.

If

If any one finds any Thing in my *Essay* to be corrected, he may, when he pleases, write against it; and when I think fit, I will Answer him. For I do not intend my Time shall be wasted at the Pleasure of every One, who may have a Mind to pick Holes in my Book, and shew his Skill in the Art of Confutation.

To conclude, Were there nothing else in it, I should not think it fit to trouble my self about the Questions of a Man, which he himself does not think worth the owning.

F I N I S.

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